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SECTION 10(B) AND THE VAGARIES
OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE
MERITS OF CODIFYING THE




Few issues in the field of securities law have proved as controver-
sial as the legitimacy and proper application of the implied private
cause of action for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and its regulatory counterpart, Rule 10b-5. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was expected by many
observers to bring about sweeping changes in the implied private cause
of action, which critics charge has been abused by overzealous litigants
bringing frivolous lawsuits. In his timely article, Professor Fallone ar-
gues that most of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's changes
to the implied private cause of action are merely procedural in nature
and fail to address the real problem: the scope of liability for securities
fraud under Section 10(b) has been rendered incomprehensible by con-
flicting court decisions and is no longer consistent with the overall goals
of the federal securities laws. The author calls for Congress to reassert
control over the content of the implied private cause of action under
Section 10(b) by codifying it.
Professor Fallone begins with an overview of the most recent secur-
ities legislation and an explanation of why it does little to resolve the
ambiguities surrounding the implied private cause of action. He then
chronicles the history of the cause of action, describing its elements as
they currently exist and how they have evolved over the years. The au-
thor then points out specific problems arising from the elements of the
cause of action having been left up to the courts, and how the common-
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law process has resulted in an interpretation of the cause of action that
is inconsistent with the overall goals of the federal securities laws. Fi-
nally, Professor Fallone recommends that Congress codify the cause of
action employing a structuralist approach, a method of statutory con-
struction which emphasizes consistency with the operating principles of
a statutory scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 1995, the U.S. Senate overrode President Clin-
ton's veto1 and enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (Act).2 The stated goal3 of this legislation was to redress the
perceived abuse of shareholder litigation under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and its attendant regulation, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.5 A coalition of critics that
included high technology corporations and accounting firms success-
fully lobbied to convince Congress that nonmeritorious "strike suits"6
brought under Rule 10b-5 were imposing unacceptable costs on legiti-
mate businesses.7 These critics complained that high-tech companies
and the professionals who advised them were too often the target of
frivolous class actions alleging securities fraud, brought by a special-
ized segment of the plaintiffs' bar, and generating nuisance settle-
ments of the class's claims conjoined with large awards of attorneys'
fees.8 A Republican majority in Congress, eager to comply with the
promise to enact litigation reform as part of its "Contract with
America," responded with the most substantial amendments to the
nation's securities laws since the New Deal.
1. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform" The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335, 335 (1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
3. As stated forcefully in the Joint Statement of the Conference Committee that sent the
bill to President Clinton, "The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity
of American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who seek to line
their pockets by bringing abusive and meritless suits." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
6. Strike suits typically are lawsuits designed to take advantage of a corporate defendant's
incentive to settle otherwise defensible claims in order to avoid the expense and uncertainty of
litigation. They have been defined simply as lawsuits based upon few substantive facts. See
WILLIAM H. LASH III, SECURITES LAW REFORM: A HALF STEP IN THE RIG-rr DIRECTION 2
(1995).
7. See Avery, supra note 1, at 339. In the context of securities litigation, it has been noted
that "[plrivate parties may... rationally pursue claims that have a relatively low probability of
success because defendants have an incentive to settle in order to avoid the costs of defense or to
avoid the small prospect of a very large adverse judgment." Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107
HARV. L. REV. 961, 969-70 (1994); see Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4-5 (1990).
8. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 970; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Rec-
ommendations for Reform, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991).
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 72 1997
VAGARIES OF THE COMMON LAW
To a certain extent, the Act is part of a renewed congressional
interest in securities regulation. Like a colossus rousing itself from a
decades-long slumber, the 104th Congress erupted in a fury of activity
that, at times, appeared motivated by a desire to rewrite the entire
content of the federal securities laws. Not all of Congress's efforts
over the last year were successful. For example, legislation introduced
to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act9 lost its momentum and was eventu-
ally abandoned. However, on October 1, 1996, the 104th Congress
finished work on ambitious legislation intended to redraw the bounda-
ries between federal and state regulation of the securities industry.'
Among other things, provisions contained in the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 199611 preempt state regulation of the
mutual fund industry, limit state oversight of investment advisory
firms that manage in excess of $25 million, and reduce the role of state
law in regulating the primary offerings of larger corporations. 12
Therefore, the Act can be viewed as but one example of Congress's
current infatuation with all things relating to securities.' 3
However, in other respects the passage of the Act is one manifes-
tation of a more particular scrutiny being directed toward the purpose,
utility, and proper scope of the private cause of action for securities
fraud. Members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and academia have
all, in one form or another, contributed to a resurgent debate concern-
ing the many facets of private litigation under Rule 10b-5.' 4 Whatever
the outcome of this debate, it is apparent that, in the future, a private
9. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1994).
10. See Leslie Eaton, Bill to Revise Securities Regulation Ready for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1996, at D3. President Clinton signed the legislation into law on Oct. 11, 1996. Seth
Goodchild & Stephanie L. Brown, The New Mutual Fund and Investment Advisor Regulations,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 1996, at 1.
11. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
12. See SECURITIES AMENDMENTS OF 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-622 (1996); THE SECURITIES
INVESTMENT PROMOTION Acr, S. REP. No. 104-293 (1996); see also Levitt Recommends Changes
to Senate Securities Legislation, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 726 (June 7, 1996); Jeffrey Taylor,
House Clears Overhaul of Securities Regulation, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1996, at A2; Jeffrey Tay-
lor, Wall Street Bill Is Likely to Advance, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1996, at C1.
13. The Securities and Exchange Commission is also engaged in a flurry of activity
designed to make substantial changes in the regulation of the securities industry. The agency has
advocated the repeal or simplification of a large number of existing regulations, and is studying
the feasibility of shifting the focus of the 1933 Securities Act away from a system of registered
offerings and toward a system of registered companies. See SEC Accepts Company Registration
Report; Issues Concept Release for Comment, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), at 4 (July 25, 1996); SEC to
Issue Concept Release on Company Registration Model, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 911 (July
26, 1996); Summary Section of Report of the SEC's Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, 28
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 356 (Mar. 8, 1996); SEC Seeks Comment on Reducing Filings for
Selling Securities, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1996, at C18.
14. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 969; Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 727 (1995); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) [herein-
after Seligman I]; Joel Seligman, The Merits Still Matter, A Rejoinder to Professor Grundfest's
Comment, Why Desimplify?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 748 (1995) [hereinafter Seligman II]; Marc I.
Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Secur-
ities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995).
No. 11
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 73 1997
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
plaintiff alleging securities fraud will have to shepherd her claim
through a much different legal environment from the one that has per-
sisted for the last fifty years.
This article posits that the current debate concerning the private
cause of action for securities fraud has its origins in a kind of "federal
common law." An examination of the private cause of action as de-
veloped by the Supreme Court reveals it to be a product of judicial
legislation: the rules governing liability have been shaped by conflict-
ing policy goals and abrupt changes in interpretive methods designed
to mask political choices. Recent congressional efforts to ameliorate
the perceived abuses of private securities litigation can achieve, at
best, limited success toward their goal, because congressional reform
largely leaves intact the preexisting judicial definition of the cause of
action. In this sense, Congress completed only half of its job when it
passed the Act.15
A process whereby the federal courts, and not Congress, dictate
the content of the securities fraud cause of action has allowed private
litigation to develop in an incoherent manner and has encouraged
overenforcement by the plaintiffs' bar. In addition, this process leaves
the cause of action unusually vulnerable to shifts in judicial philoso-
phy that bear no relation to the purposes served by the Securities Ex-
change Act. The result of using the common-law process to define the
cause of action has been 'to create an internal inconsistency within
Section 10(b) itself and a structural inconsistency between Section
10(b) and the remainder of the federal securities laws. These inconsis-
tencies have developed slowly, over time, and they cannot be resolved
by the judiciary other than by a similarly gradual process. An alterna-
tive solution, codification of the private cause of action, is therefore
necessary in order to achieve more immediate reform. Ideally, this
codification should take place at the legislative, and not administra-
tive, level.
Part II of this article outlines recent political developments rele-
vant to securities fraud jurisprudence and the reforms instituted by
Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. It con-
cludes that the new law will have little effect on the scope of the cause
of action as developed by the courts. Part III traces the development
of the federal common law of securities fraud and summarizes the ele-
ments of the cause of action as currently defined. In part IV, this arti-
cle critiques the federal common-law process as a method of giving
content to the 10b-5 cause of action, arguing that the vagaries of
judge-made law lead to unpredictability and internal inconsistencies in
the scope of the cause of action that are particularly troublesome in
the context of the securities laws. Finally, part V proposes the codifi-
cation of the securities fraud cause of action in a manner consistent
15. Cf. LASH, supra note 6, at 14-16.
[Vol. 1997
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with a "structuralist" interpretation of the securities laws. A struc-
turalist interpretation of the scope of the implied Rule 10b-5 cause of
action places primacy on basic principles that can be derived from the
express causes of action contained elsewhere in the securities laws.
Codification pursuant to these principles, rather than evolving policy
rationales or the plain meaning of the text of Section 10(b), is the
most appealing alternative available to address the deficiencies that
have developed in the cause of action.
II. RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO SECURITIES
FRAUD JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Terms of the Debate
The current debate over the private cause of action for securities
fraud has been inspired in part by a general perception that our judi-
cial system is increasingly overburdened and abused. To the public at
large, litigation of all stripes often is seen to bestow little benefit to
any segment of society other than attorneys.' 6 In the securities area,
the limits of government resources have long led policy makers and
courts to recognize the efficiencies realized by recruiting "private at-
torneys general" to assist in policing the securities markets.' 7 As the
years have passed, however, certain segments of the plaintiffs' bar
have discharged their function as private attorneys general with a zeal
bordering upon obsession. Critics have charged that the number of
nonmeritorious securities fraud suits has increased substantially in re-
cent years. 18
Whether or not the number of frivolous securities fraud class ac-
tions has ballooned over time remains a matter of some dispute. Em-
pirical studies suggest that the size of a settlement in a securities fraud
action is determined primarily by the funds available in the defend-
ant's insurance pool, rather than by an analysis of the merits underly-
ing the plaintiffs' claims.' 9 These studies suggest that the claims being
16. See generally Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and
Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 723 (1994) (examining negative public perception of lawyers and sug-
gesting ways to improve it); Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1245 (1993)
(discussing reform proposals for various aspects of civil justice system in light of public criticism);
Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996, at
21, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wklyst File (discussing the rise of trial lawyers as the most
powerful professional special interest group in American politics).
17. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
18. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 10 (1993) (statements of
John G. Adler, Edward R. McCraken, Richard J. Egan & F. Thomas Dunlop, Jr.); see also LASH,
supra note 6, at 4 (citing Wyatt & Co. study); John C. Coffee, Jr., The "New Learning" on
Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1993, at 5.
19. See generally FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS 11:
WHAT ExPLAINs SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACIONS? (NERA Oct. 1993); VIN-
CENT E. O'BRIEN & RICHARD HODGES, A STUDY OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
1988-1993; Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
No. 1]
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asserted have little legal support and are brought primarily to obtain
attorneys' fees as the prime component of a nuisance settlement. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has denied the exist-
ence of any recent litigation "explosion" with respect to securities
fraud suits.2"
Even if the relative percentage of securities fraud suits in federal
court has remained constant over time, other, less quantifiable, factors
may have converged in recent years to magnify the burden that such
suits place on the judicial system. For example, a rise in criminal pros-
ecutions in federal courts has substantially reduced the time and re-
sources available to the entire civil docket.2 In addition, the current
percentage of the federal docket devoted to securities fraud cases may
only be sustainable due to the demonstrated willingness of defendants
in those cases to settle claims before trial22-a predilection that may
change as the legal environment facing those claims changes.
As a result, the potential overenforcement of the prohibition on
securities fraud continues to occupy the attention of courts and policy
makers. Even if the empirical evidence pertaining to a current litiga-
tion explosion is murky, many argue that the reform of the private
securities fraud cause of action is justified solely due to the public per-
ception of a looming crisis.2 3 Businesspersons and government regula-
tors alike recognize the possibility that, at some point, the resources of
the judicial system may be taxed beyond capability by prolonged at-
tention to nonmeritorious suits and that, eventually, the legal costs
borne by U.S. corporations in defense of such suits may grow to intol-
erable levels.24 For some observers, the debate concerning the proper
scope of the private cause of action for securities fraud begins and
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action
Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 491, 510-11 (1996). Professor Seligman has
criticized the methodologies and/or data employed in the Alexander, Dunbar, and O'Brien &
Hodges studies and suggests that they are inconclusive. See Seligman I, supra note 14, at 450-55.
20. In June 17, 1993, testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, SEC Enforcement
Division Director William McLucas asserted that the approximate aggregate number of securi-
ties cases in federal courts (including Commission cases) had not increased over the past two
decades and that the increase in securities class action suits in the prior three years, while signifi-
cant, did not constitute an "explosion." See SEC on 'Explosion' of Suits, WALL ST. J., June 18,
1993, at B6. Professor Seligman argues that the relative constancy of the number of corporations
named as defendants from year to year (an average of 123.5 different companies sued each year
over a four-year period) belies the existence of any sudden onslaught of nonmeritorious claims.
See Seligman I, supra note 14, at 444.
21. See Sheldon H. Elsen, U.S. Courts Are at Risk, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1991, at 13; Abner J.
Mikva, The Treadmill of Criminal Justice Reform, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 5, 10 (1995); Roger J.
Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start at the Top, 77 JUDICATURE 104, 105 (1993).
22. See also Steven P. Marino & Rende D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities
Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J.
115 (1994).
23. See Avery, supra note 1, at 340 (quoting congressional testimony of Professor Donald
Langevoort); see also Grundfest, supra note 7, at 972-74.
24. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants
and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1027-29 (1996).
[Vol. 1997
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ends with the goal of filtering out private suits that are inspired by
benign conduct and that, therefore, impose high social costs while
generating little or no deterrent benefit.25
A second factor contributing to the growing debate over the pri-
vate cause of action for securities fraud has been the Supreme Court's
evolving approach toward statutory construction. Although the oper-
ative language of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act has
remained the same since its enactment in 1934, the manner in which
the Supreme Court interprets that language has changed. As a result,
the Court has concluded that Section 10(b) operates within bounda-
ries much different from those previously contemplated, thereby re-
opening questions concerning the parameters of securities fraud that
many observers had long considered to be settled.26 For some critics
of private litigation, this uncertainty concerning the content of the pri-
vate cause of action provides an opportunity to "rewrite" the prohibi-
tion on securities fraud, while maintaining only the most basic outline
of its traditional form.2 7 Indeed, the continued efficacy of the private
cause of action altogether-once an unassailable premise-has even
become part of the debate.28
B. A Fertile Environment for Reform
Criticism of vexatious litigation under Rule 10b-5 is, of course,
nothing new. Complaints have been made to Congress before, with
little or no discernible effect. The characteristics and motivations29 of
"strike suits" were so well known over the past two decades as to
merit extensive commentary in textbooks and court opinions.30 How-
ever, in 1995, for the first time, several factors coalesced to overcome
Congress's previous inertia on the topic of reforming private litigation
under Rule 10b-5.
25. See id. at 1023-27.
26. See David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule lOb-5 After Central
Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAW. 1479, 1486 (1994).
27. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 1011-14.
28. See id. at 964-65; Grundfest, supra note 14, at 727.
29. In the Joint Statement of the Conference Committee, lawmakers listed the following
abusive practices that they found to be sufficiently prevalent in securities litigation as to merit
corrective action:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a
significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of
the issuer, and with only a faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to
some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including ac-
countants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard
to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burden-
some that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation
by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent.
H.R. Corn'. REP. No. 104-369, at 730 (1995).
30. See, e.g., Shields v. Smith, No. C-90-0349 FMS, 1991 WL 319032, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
4, 1991); LEwis D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORiAONs LAW AND PoLIcy 1033-34 (3d ed. 1994)
(discussing derivative suits).
No. 11
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First, the Republicans had recaptured control of the House of
Representatives one year earlier and firmly controlled the legislative
agenda for the first time in decades. Trial lawyers in general, and the
plaintiffs' securities bar in particular, have long been counted among
the leading financial contributors to Democratic members of Con-
gress. 3 It has been suggested that this financial support was responsi-
ble for Congress's failure to place high priority on securities litigation
reform during the period when the Democrats controlled the legisla-
tive agenda.32 By coincidence or not, several wide-ranging bills to re-
form various aspects of the securities laws quickly began to move
through Congress after the Republicans won control of the House.33
Second, proponents of the legislation may have felt emboldened
to finally address the recognized shortcomings of securities fraud liti-
gation in light of the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive interpre-
tation of the scope of private lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5.34
31. See Douglas Fantz, Trial Lawyers, Their Money and Their Influence Have Become Is-
sues in the Campaign, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 13, 1996, at Al; Richard B. Schmitt, As Clinton Vows to
Veto Products-Liability Bill, Some Ask if He's Too Beholden to Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar.
22, 1996, at A14; Glenn R. Simpson, Trial Lawyers, After Flirting with GOP in 1995, Are Sitting
at Democratic Party's Table Again, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at A12.
32. See Fantz, supra note 31, at Al (stating that "business groups say lawyers have used
their political influence and well-placed contributions to thwart reforms").
33. Controversy surrounding the role played by the plaintiffs' bar in influencing the content
of the securities laws continues. Supporters of the 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act blamed
financial contributions from the plaintiffs' bar for influencing President Clinton's veto of the
legislation (subsequently overridden). See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson, Clinton's Payoffs to the Trial
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1996, at A10. In California, the plaintiffs' bar had bankrolled
Proposition 211, a November 1996 ballot initiative intended to resurrect those aspects of private
securities litigation in federal court that were eliminated by the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act by incorporating them into California state securities law. See Glenn Burkins, Clinton
Opposes Measures to Make It Easier for Shareholders to Sue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at B2;
California Initiative Could Undermine Reform Legislation, Lawyers Warn, 28 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 971 (Aug. 9, 1996). Proposition 211 was defeated by a wide margin. See Bob Davis
& G. Pascal Zachary, Affirmative Action, Shareholder Lawsuits and Tax Increases Are Rejected
by Voters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at A17.
34. Examples of restrictive legal rules adopted by the Court include the adoption of a new,
shorter statute of limitations for 10b-5 actions that was given retroactive effect. See Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). The retroactive applica-
tion of the Court's decision would have cleared the federal docket of a substantial number of
securities fraud suits. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Was the Lampf Quick Fix
Constitutional?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 16. Congress attempted to ameliorate the effect of
the Lampf decision by statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994), but the Supreme Court subse-
quently held the statute to be unconstitutional to the extent that it sought to prevent the retroac-
tive application of the rule announced in Lampf. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1447 (1995); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413, 438 n.113 (1993).
Most recently, the Court has restricted the substantive reach of the statute by eliminating aiding
and abetting liability and adopting reasoning which foretells the eventual demise of liability
based on common-law principles of respondeat superior. See Edward Fallone, The Clinton
Court Is Open for Business: The Business Law Jurisprudence of Justice Stephen Breyer, 59 Mo.
L. REV. 857, 879 n.112 (1994) (stating that "the Court's reasoning in Central Bank appears to
signal the future demise of vicarious liability in private actions brought under Rule 10b-5");
Ediberto Roman, Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure of Textualism, 75
NEB. L. REv. 401 (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 55, on file with University of Illinois Law
[Vol. 1997
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The influence on Congress of present judicial attitudes toward private
securities litigation should not be underestimated. In the early history
of securities fraud litigation, the federal courts adopted a broad inter-
pretation of the conduct that qualifies as "fraud," thereby making it
easy for an aggrieved investor to allege facts sufficient to support a
cause of action. In the majority of its more recent decisions, the
Supreme Court has pared back the reach of the Rule 10b-5 private
cause of action.36 The legislative history of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act evidences congressional approval of the Supreme
Court's change in direction. 37
Finally, passage of the Act undoubtedly also was assisted by the
fact that Arthur Levitt was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) at the time reform measures were introduced.
Chairman Levitt gave the legislation his qualified support, and the en-
dorsement of the Chairman went far to win over some wavering
lawmakers. Many observers of the SEC were surprised at Chairman
Levitt's position, because support of the bill appeared to be a change
in direction for an agency that in the past had zealously defended the
utility of private litigation as an aid to enforcement.38
However, Chairman Levitt's reaction to the bill appears to be
consistent with a basic shift in recent years in the manner in which the
SEC views private litigation. Historically, the SEC has argued that
private litigation should play an expansive role in the enforcement of
antifraud rules.39 Under Chairman Levitt, the SEC has shifted gears
and undertaken a coordinated effort to actively discourage "unneces-
sary" private litigation under the securities laws.a0 The SEC has come
to view abusive or nonmeritorious litigation as a significant threat to
Review) (stating "it appears that under Central Bank's analysis, respondeat superior claims
under section 10(b) may no longer be viable").
35. See Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892 (1977).
36. See Steinberg, supra note 14, at 491-96.
37. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698 (stating
that overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver to eliminate aiding and
abetting liability by explicitly providing for such liability in the statute would "be contrary to [the
Act's] goal of reducing meritless securities litigation"). Significantly, several members of the
Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee criticized the legislation for failing to
overturn prior Supreme Court decisions that shortened the 10b-5 statute of limitations and elimi-
nated aiding and abetting liability in a private action under Rule 10b-5. See S. REP. No. 104-98,
at 36 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 674, 725-28 (additional views of Senators Sarbanes,
Bryan, and Boxer).
38. See, e.g., Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113
(1993) (statement of William R. McLucas).
39. Professor Grundfest notes that "the Commission has, since the dawn of reported litiga-
tion over the question, consistently urged that courts interpret Rule lob-5 to support the
broadest possible scope for an implied private right of action." Grundfest, supra note 7, at 977-
78.
40. See Christi Harlan, SEC's Levitt Talks of Active Attempts to Curb Litigation, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 27, 1994, at B7.
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its mission of protecting investors,41 fearing that courts may react to
perceived litigation abuses by adopting substantive restrictions on pri-
vate actions that would work to the detriment of all investors.42
Therefore, curbing frivolous litigation is now seen by the SEC as a
necessary strategic step in the effort to preserve current investor pro-
tections from further judicial pruning.43
The debate over Congress's recent move to reform securities
fraud litigation must be understood in light of the environment de-
scribed above. Critics of the Act claimed that it effectively eviscerated
the private cause of action under Rule 10b-5. 41 Supporters of the leg-
islation viewed it as a necessary vehicle for returning securities fraud
litigation to its original, more noble, purposes. 5 In reality, however,
the most significant of the reforms embodied in the Act are purely
procedural in character and do not affect the content or elements of
the securities fraud cause of action in any significant way.
41. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 1022 n.301 (noting that "a majority of the sitting Com-
mission has stated that private securities fraud litigation poses a problem that should be ad-
dressed"). The make-up of the Commission has changed since the time of Professor Grundfest's
remark, however.
42. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, "Firm-Specific" Information and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Doctrina4 Etymologica4 and Theoretical Critique, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1409, 1444-45 (1994)
(quoting Letter from Simon M. Lome, SEC General Counsel, to Lester Brickman, Cardozo Law
School, Feb. 18, 1994).
43. In November, 1994, the SEC took the remarkable step of acting in an amicus capacity
in support of a motion to dismiss a private plaintiff's securities fraud claim in district court. In a
letter addressed to the defendant in the action, then-General Counsel of the SEC Simon Lome
stated that the complaint in Frank v. Cooper Industries, Inc., Civ. Action No. H-94-0280 (S.D.
Tex.), was inadequate to plead the existence of a false or misleading representation. See Letter
from Simon Lome, SEC General Counsel, to Cooper Industries, Inc., Houston, Texas (Nov. 8,
1994) (on file with the University ofIllinois Law Review). In the course of presenting this view,
Lome noted the general adverse effects of meritless securities litigation on the investing public:
Such litigation can impose substantial unnecessary costs, including discovery expenses, at-
torneys fees, and time lost by corporate management. These costs are ultimately borne in
the case of a publicly held corporate defendant by the public shareholders. Another cost to
public shareholders may be reduced information on which to base investment decisions if
corporations, fearful of undue exposure to litigation, limit the extent to which they volunta-
rily disclose information .... The threat of meritless litigation may also affect adversely the
efficiency of capital formation and the allocation of capital resources.
Finally, meritless litigation may adversely affect the development of substantive securi-
ties law, as courts either develop erroneous or unworkable securities law concepts or misap-
ply correct securities law concepts in an attempt to curb what they perceive as vexatious
litigation. Unfortunately, such developments adversely affect meritorious actions, whether
brought by investors or the Commission.
lId at 3; see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Issues Amicus Letter at the District Court Level to Stem Meritless Securities Litigation, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at B5. Despite the views of the SEC expressed in the letter, the district court
denied the motion to dismiss on February 6, 1995. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the House Comm on Commerce,
104th Cong. 200 n.20 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt).
44. See William J. Clinton, Presidential Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); see also Joel Seligman, The
Private Securities Reform Act of.1995, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 717, 718 (1996) (discussing opposition to
earlier incarnation of the legislation).
45. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 730-31 (1995); SEN. REP. No. 104-98, at 8-10
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-89.
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C. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The Act, as originally drafted, was intended to revolutionize the
manner in which private actions are brought under Rule 10b-5. Early
drafts of the legislation contained many procedural reforms, some of
them novel in character, intended to discourage the filing of meritless
claims. For example, the original draft of the House bill contained a
"loser pays" system that would have required unsuccessful parties to
reimburse the attorneys' fees of prevailing parties.46 Other provisions
were intended to redefine the scope of conduct that could give rise to
liability under Rule 10b-5. The original House bill would have elimi-
nated liability for reckless conduct, thereby codifying a more restric-
tive scienter requirement than is currently applied. 47 The same draft
also would have required the plaintiff in a private cause of action to
demonstrate actual knowledge of and reliance upon a misstatement,
thereby eliminating the "fraud on the market" theory48 as a basis for
liability under Section 10(b).49
However, the final legislation, as it developed in congressional
subcommittees and eventually in conference committee, largely con-
fines itself to procedural reforms and avoids questions relating to the
definition of fraudulent conduct. As it relates to the Securities Ex-
change Act, the law contains eight general reforms to private litiga-
tion.5 0 Few of the reforms relate in any meaningful way to the actual
scope of liability to be imposed under Rule 10b-5.
1. Class Action Procedures
The Act contains procedural provisions designed to reduce the
ability of the plaintiffs' bar to serve as the instigator of class action
filings and to diminish the likelihood that owners of a small economic
stake in the defendant corporation will become the class representa-
tive in a suit brought under Rule 10b-5.51 In furtherance of this goal,
the Act requires all plaintiffs seeking to serve as representatives in
class actions under the Securities Exchange Act to file sworn certifica-
tions stating, among other things, that they have reviewed the com-
46. See Avery, supra note 1, at 348.
47. See id.
48. "The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and devel-
oped securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business. Misleading statements will therefore de-
fraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers did not directly rely on the misstatements." Peil
v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), quoted with approval in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
49. See Avery, supra note 1, at 348.
50. The following discussion is limited to those aspects of the new law that directly affect
securities fraud actions under the Securities Exchange Act. The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act also modifies the Securities Act of 1933 in several similar respects and contains an
important modification to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
51. See H.R. CorNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 731 (1995).
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plaints, that they did not purchase stock at the direction of counsel in
order to qualify as class representatives, and that they will not accept
any payment for serving as class representatives.52 The Act also con-
tains new procedures for the appointment of lead plaintiff in a securi-
ties class action and requires courts to presume that the plaintiff with
the "largest financial stake in the relief sought" is the most appropri-
ate lead plaintiff.53 In addition, Section 21D(a)(3) of the Act also pro-
vides that the lead plaintiff appointed under these procedures will be
responsible for selecting and retaining lead counsel, and it contains
provisions limiting the capacity of any person to serve as a lead plain-
tiff more than five times over any three-year period.54 All of these
provisions serve to enhance the independence of the lead plaintiff
from the attorney for the class.
The class action attorney's influence and control over the course
of the litigation is further diminished by provisions in the Act that
limit the lead plaintiff's recovery to a pro rata share of the final judg-
ment, thereby reducing the prospect of the lead plaintiff being co-
opted by class counsel.55 A provision that bars the filing of settle-
ments under seal without "good cause" operates to discourage self-
serving settlements on the part of counsel.56 All proposed and final
settlements now must be disseminated to the members of the class in a
new format designed to include all of the information deemed neces-
sary to permit the class to evaluate the settlement.57 In addition, the
lead attorney's fees are capped at a "reasonable percentage" of the
amount of damages and interest actually paid to the class, thus tying
the attorney's compensation more closely to the interests of the
class. 8
52. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 753 (1995) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(a)(2)). For ease of reference, this article will use the citation "Securities Exchange Act
§ " to denote the Securities Exchange Act as amended by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.
53. Securities Exchange Act § 21D(a)(3). See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A.
Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litiga-
tion, 38 Aliz. L. REV. 559 (1996). In July 1996, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board as-
serted its rights as a class action member under this provision and successfully filed a motion
seeking to replace class counsel with counsel of its own choosing. See Lee Bergquist, State Fund
Trying to Flex Legal Muscle, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1996, at Dl; Dean
Starkman, Fund Displaces Law Firm to Lead CellStar Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1996, at B9;
Dean Starkman, Pension Fund to Test New Securities Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1996, at B7. The
Wisconsin Investment Board is among the largest institutional investors to date to utilize this
new statutory provision. See Keith Johnson, Deployment of Institutions in the Securities Class
Action Wars, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 627, 631 (1996).
54. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(a)(3).
55. See id. § 21D(a)(4).
56. See id. § 21D(a)(5).
57. See id. § 21D(a)(7).
58. See id. § 21D(a)(6).
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2. Delay of Fact Discovery
The Act contains provisions designed to delay the onset of litiga-
tion costs associated with fact discovery until after the defendant has
had the opportunity to bring a motion to dismiss.5 9 Section
21D(b)(3)(B) provides that all discovery must be stayed during the
pendency of a motion to dismiss, except for discovery of particular
facts necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
a party.60 By delaying fact discovery in this manner, the Act reduces
the likelihood that either side will use the discovery process as a fish-
ing expedition to bolster uncertain claims or as a bludgeon to coerce a
settlement.
3. Imposition of Proportionate Liability
The Act alters the present system of joint and several liability in
order to limit the circumstances under which one defendant is re-
quired to pay for injuries caused by the conduct of another defend-
ant.61 A new system of "fair share" proportionate liability is instituted
whereby, under certain circumstances, a particular defendant may be
held liable solely for the portion of the judgment for which he is ad-
judged responsible. Proportionate liability applies where the defend-
ant has been found liable for a non-knowing (i.e., reckless) violation
of the Securities Exchange Act and, in addition, neither of the follow-
ing scenarios exists: (a) the plaintiff has a net worth of less than
$200,000 and is entitled to damages in excess of ten percent of her net
worth, or (b) a codefendant is insolvent and cannot pay his share of
damages.62 Joint and several liability remains the rule in most other
circumstances, including cases where the defendants have been found
liable for a knowing or intentional violation of the law.
63
4. Strengthening Rule 11
The Act strengthens the application of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to private securities actions in order to better
deter frivolous filings.' 4 The law now requires the court, upon final
adjudication of the action, to enter findings in the record concerning
each attorney's compliance with his or her obligations under Rule 11
59. See H.R. Corw. REp. No. 104-369, at 736 (1995).
60. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(3)(B); see also Medhekar v. United States Dist.
Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that initial disclosure
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) are subject to the Act's stay
provisions).
61. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 736-37.
62. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(g).
63. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution Rights and Settle-
ment Effects, 51 Bus. LAW. 1157, 1162 (1996).
64. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 738; see, e.g., Katz v. Household Int'l, Inc., 91 F.3d
1036 (7th Cir. 1996).
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in connection with the lawsuit.65 Where the court determines that the
requirements of Rule 11 have been violated, the Act requires the im-
position of sanctions, with the rebuttable presumption that sanctions
will take the form of attorneys' fees and CoStS.66 In a class action, the
court has the authority to require an advance undertaking from the
attorney for the class to provide for the payment of any fees and ex-
penses ultimately awarded under Rule 11.67
5. Heightened Pleading Requirements
The Act heightens the pleading standards necessary in any com-
plaint under the Securities Exchange Act that requires an allegation
of the defendant's state of mind. The goal of the Act is to "establish
uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless lawsuits. '68 Wherever liability is dependent upon the de-
fendant having acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint
must contain particularized facts that give rise to a "strong inference"
that the defendant possessed the requisite scienter.69 It remains to be
seen whether courts will interpret this new standard in a manner that
is meaningfully different from previous pleading requirements.7 °
In addition, the Act underscores the requirement that the plain-
tiff must plead and prove loss causation as an element of her case.7'
Although the language of the Act states only that the plaintiff in a
private action has the burden of proving loss causation,72 the legisla-
65. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(c).
66. See id.
67. See id. § 21D(a)(8).
68. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 740.
69. Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2).
70. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 977-85 (1996) (suggesting that courts
retain discretion to avoid the harsh effects of a heightened pleading standard); Elliott J. Weiss,
The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARiz. L.
REv. 675, 706-07 (1996) (stating that "the principal effect of sec. 21D(b)(2) may be to add unnec-
essarily to motion practice in open market fraud cases, not to eliminate meritorious claims").
71. See H.R. CoNrF. REP. No. 104-369, at 740. Prior to the enactment of this provision, a
growing number of federal court opinions had dismissed complex securities fraud claims on the
basis of the plaintiffs' failure to adequately allege and prove the element of loss causation. See
THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURtrrIEs REOULATION 818-20 (3d ed. 1996). These courts
reasoned that common-law fraud principles counsel in favor of a strict requirement that the
plaintiff establish loss causation. Plaintiffs in a private 10b-5 action must therefore show that
their entire loss was directly caused by the subject matter of the misrepresentation before they
may recover. It is not sufficient to show that the misrepresentation induced the purchase or sale
of the stock and that events unrelated to the defendants caused the loss. See id. Some critics
have questioned the validity of loss causation as a separate element of the cause of action in light
of the remedial congressional purposes underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress: A Study of Contradiction in the Federal
Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1083 (1990); Michael J. Kaufman, Loss Causation: Expos-
ing a Fraud on Securities Law Jurisprudence, 24 IND. L. REV. 357, 397 (1991); Andrew L. Merritt,
A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the
Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV. 469, 492 (1988).
72. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(4).
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tive history of the Act evidences an intent to require an allegation of
loss causation in the complaint itself.73 Therefore, a general allegation
of transaction (or "but for") causation would appear insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.
6. New Measure of Damages
The. Act introduces a new method for calculating damages once
liability has been ascertained in a case alleging securities fraud. The
goal of Congress was to reduce the uncertainty involved in calculating
damages using the market price of the security at issue at the time that
the misrepresentation was publicly disclosed. Congress feared that
the use of the market price in calculating damages often leads to an
overestimation of the plaintiff's damages, due to the possibility that
the price at the time of disclosure resulted from market conditions
unconnected to the fraud.74 Therefore, the Act contains provisions
that no damage award based on the market price of a security may
exceed the difference between the purchase (or sale) price of the se-
curity and the mean trading price at which the security traded within
the ninety-day period immediately following the disclosure of correc-
tive information.75
7. New Statutory Duties for Auditors
The Act imposes explicit new duties on corporate auditors to
identify and report suspected illegal conduct. These duties include ob-
ligations to investigate possible illegalities that come to the attention
of the auditor during its engagement, obligations to report instances of
illegal conduct to the appropriate level of management and to the
board of directors, and obligations, under certain circumstances, to re-
port instances of illegal conduct to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.76 These new auditor obligations serve as a counterweight to
the procedural restrictions contained elsewhere in the Act.77 Proce-
dural restrictions may be detrimental to an enforcement system that
relies heavily on the threat of litigation by private attorneys general to
deter fraud, but the new duties imposed on auditors indicate an over-
all attempt by Congress to compensate for these restrictions by shift-
ing some of the enforcement burden toward independent accountants.
73. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 740.
74. See id. at 741.
75. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(e).
76. See id. § 10A.
77. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 24, at 1062-64.
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8. New Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Information
One of the most significant provisions of the Act creates a statu-
tory safe harbor for the disclosure of forward-looking information.78
Congress acted to create this safe harbor out of fear that the prospect
of abusive litigation has discouraged corporate managers from disclos-
ing internal projections and similar forecasts to the marketplace.79
The Act's safe harbor applies to forward-looking statements made by
a reporting company, its management or employees, or by auditors
and underwriters engaged in its behalf.80
Statements that qualify for the safe harbor cannot give rise to
private liability if either of two tests is met. First, no private liability
may be imposed for forward-looking statements made without actual
knowledge that the statements were false or misleading.8' Second, no
private liability may be imposed if the forward-looking statement is
identified as such when made and is accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary language identifying important factors that could prevent the
statement from becoming accurate.82
In enacting the safe harbor provision, Congress expressly ap-
proved of two other safe harbors for forward-looking information that
remain available under the Securities Exchange Act.83 Rule 3b-6 pro-
vides that forward-looking statements contained in a document filed
with the SEC shall not be deemed fraudulent unless made or reaf-
firmed without a reasonable basis or disclosed in bad faith.' In addi-
tion, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine holds that certain forward-
looking statements are not actionable if accompanied by cautionary
language because (1) such statements may be immaterial as a matter
of law, and (2) plaintiffs are not entitled to justifiably rely upon such
statements.8 5 The safe harbor contained in the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act is not intended to displace either one of these pre-
existing protections for forward-looking statements. 86
D. What the Reform Act Does Not Do
The Act is actually change on a modest scale!' Its most signifi-
cant reforms are reforms of the procedural limitations placed on the
78. See Securities Exchange Act § 21E.
79. See H.R. CorN. REP. No. 104-369, at 741-42 (1995).
80. See Avery, supra note 1, at 355. The Act excludes statements contained in the financial
statements of the company and statements made in connection with a tender offer or initial
public offering from the protections of the safe harbor. See icL
81. See id
82. See id
83. See H.R. CornF. REP. No. 104-369, at 742.
84. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1995).
85. See Avery, supra note 1, at 344.
86. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 745.
87. In the wake of the Reform Act's passage, one attorney observer has noted that new
securities fraud filings in federal court have not slowed significantly and "to a large extent, it's
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class action plaintiff and her attorney in a securities fraud lawsuit. The
primary goals of the legislation are transparent: to allow more claims
to be dismissed at the pleading stage, to place greater control over
litigation in the hands of large shareholder plaintiffs (as opposed to
the owners of single shares and their "strike suit" lawyers), and to
enact penalties for filing a lawsuit without an adequate factual investi-
gation of the asserted claims. With the exception of the safe harbor
provisions, the Act could well have been entitled "The Class Action
Reform Act." Most of its goals could have been addressed via
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as opposed to amend-
ments to the Securities Exchange Act.
Despite the passage of the Act, it is readily apparent that most of
the preexisting judge-made law concerning the scope of the Rule 10b-
5 cause of action remains untouched. The Act does touch upon the
scope of liability in the following ways: (1) the previously recognized
existence of loss causation as a separate element of the plaintiff's case
is reaffirmed; (2) the measure of damages and the application of pro-
portionate liability are modified for certain cases; and (3) one change
to existing standards of liability is effectuated through the creation of
a safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
The Act purposefully avoids defining the state of mind required
for imposition of liability for securities fraud."8 It leaves for another
day the issues raised by the "fraud on the market" theory. The sole
meaningful change to the scope of conduct giving rise to liability is the
creation of a new safe harbor of limited availability, which may act to
foreclose liability under some circumstances where the judicially cre-
ated "bespeaks caution" doctrine does not.
89
By failing to do little more than fiddle with the elements of the
cause of action as currently defined, the Act avoids the fundamental
question underlying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area:
What types of conduct should give rise to a private cause of action
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? Although the new legislation
will make it more difficult for certain types of "professional plaintiffs"
and their attorneys to assert claims, it will have little effect on the
ability of plaintiffs in general to recover under a law whose boundaries
business as usual." Phyllis Diamond, California Initiative Could Undermine Reform Legislation,
Lawyers Warn, 28 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 971, 972 (Aug. 9, 1996); see also Dean
Starkman, Securities Class-Action Suits Seem Immune to Effects of a New Law, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 12, 1996, at B7. But see Stephen F. Black et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: A Preliminary Analysis, 24 SEc. REo. L.J. 117, 141 (1996) ("The Reform Act is an
ambitious effort to curb the costs and burdens imposed by private federal securities litigation on
issuers and others.").
88. See Avery, supra note 1, at 337, 369-71.
89. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 989-96 (discussing ambiguities concerning the extent to
which the new statutory safe harbor provides protections beyond the bespeaks caution doctrine);
see also Wallman Cites Lack of Consensus Within SEC on Safe Harbor Disclosure, 28 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1368-69 (Nov. 8, 1996) (same).
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are currently uncertain. 90 Even after Congress's recent effort to reas-
sert itself in the arena of securities fraud, the primary expositor of the
scope of conduct that constitutes a violation of Section 10(b) remains
the federal judiciary.91 It is therefore appropriate to review the his-
tory of the judiciary's interpretation of the private cause of action.
III. THE COURSE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW UNDER SECTION
10(B)
A. Central Bank of Denver as Revisionist History
In its 1993-94 Term, the Supreme Court decided Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.' The decision, holding that
aiding and abetting liability was not available in a private action
brought under Rule 10b-5,93 surprised many who had been following
the case.9 a On the surface, at least, the ruling was unexpected because
the Court's holding pertaining to the existence of aiding and abetting
liability was contrary to the holding of every circuit court to have de-
cided the issue. 95
An equally important, if less obvious, aspect of the case was the
manner in which the majority opinion characterized the Supreme
Court's prior Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. In the eyes of the majority,
all of the Court's prior cases interpreting the private cause of action
could be categorized in one of two fashions: (1) cases going to the
scope of liability under Section 10(b) or (2) cases interpreting the ele-
ments of the cause of action. The majority opinion stated that the
Court has consistently considered itself bound by the language of Sec-
tion 10(b) when considering whether to expand the scope of private
90. It is unrealistic to expect federal judges to police abusive securities fraud litigation
solely through procedural mechanisms such as Rules 9(b) or 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and to leave the substantive contours of liability untouched. But cf. Cunningham,
supra note 42, at 1445 n.149. To a great extent, the parties before the court frame the issues to
be decided. A judge faced with a claim that he or she perceives to be without merit may not
wish to punish the attorney for arguing a good faith extension of the law, but nonetheless may be
influenced in deciding the substantive question at issue by a desire to foreclose similar argu-
ments in the future.
91. Cf. Avery, supra note 1, at 377 (concluding that the Act "contents itself with ... periph-
eral matters").
92. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
93. See id. at 191-92.
94. See Simon M. Lorne, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 Bus. LAW. 1467 (1994) (pro-
jecting outcome of hypothetical case); Therese H. Maynard, Central Bank. The Methodology,
the Message, and the Future, 29 Loy. L REv. 1 (1995); Ruder, supra note 26; Joel Seligman, The
Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429 (1994); Lisa Klein Wagner & John E. Failla,
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.-The Beginning of an
End or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. LAW. 1451 (1994).
95. See 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Aiding and abetting is itself a violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989); Congregation of the Passion v. Kid-
der Peabody & Co., 800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784
F.2d 29, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1986) (Breyer, J.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987).
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liability to reach certain conduct.96 In contrast, the Court explained
that in the interpretation of the elements of the 10b-5 cause of action,
it has attempted to infer how Congress would have defined a scheme
of private liability along the lines of the express causes of action con-
tained in the securities laws.9 7 In the latter task, the Court conceded
that it has allowed its decisions to be informed by common-law fraud
principles and public policy rationales external to the text of Section
10(b).98
In the majority's view, the question of aiding and abetting liability
fell within the first category of cases. Because the language of Section
10(b) does not expressly prohibit conduct that aids or abets a primary
violation of the statute, the Court held that no private liability may be
imposed for such conduct.9 9 In the familiar offhand tone used by ap-
pellate courts that want to add rhetorical weight to a dubious asser-
tion, the majority opinion suggested that the result in Central Bank of
Denver was "uncontroversial" and should have been obvious to any-
one who had bothered to read its prior precedent. 1°°
In reality, the Court's precedent is not subject to such a facile
interpretation. Prior case law does not exhibit clearly distinct method-
ologies being applied to cases involving the scope of prohibited con-
duct versus cases defining the elements of a cause of action. It is true
that the Supreme Court has often suggested that the scope of liability
under any provision of the securities laws cannot be determined with-
out reference to the language of the statute.10' However, despite oc-
casional warnings that the Court would refuse to read Section 10(b)
"more broadly than its language and.., statutory scheme reasonably
permit,"' 1 2 the scope of liability under the implied private cause of
action for securities fraud has long been informed by policy rationales
and other grounds of decision unconnected to the actual text of the
statute.
03
96. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 172-73.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 186-87.
99. See id. at 177-78.
100. The majority opinion states:
We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted even by those courts recognizing a
§ 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action, that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself
reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation.... It is inconsistent with settled methodol-
ogy in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statu-
tory text.
Id.
101. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988).
102. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103, 116 (1978)); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
103. See Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection,
Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. (McGraw Hill) 133, 136 n.28 (Aug. 1, 1994); Michael J. Kaufman,
Mending the Weathered Jurisdictional Fences in the Supreme Court's Securities Fraud Decisions,
49 SMU L. REV. 159, 173-74 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule
10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 886-87 (1995); Stein-
berg, supra note 14, at 494-96. As a result of its determination that the issue presented went to
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For example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,1°4 the
Court defined the class of potential plaintiffs with standing to bring a
claim in a private action under Section 10(b). The Court held that
only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to bring a
claim. °5 By implication, Blue Chip Stamps restricted the scope of
conduct that would be actionable under the statute: an individual can-
not be held liable for a misleading statement or omission that merely
dissuades someone else from purchasing or selling a security.
Central Bank of Denver states that prior decisions like Blue Chip
Stamps going to the scope of liability under Section 10(b) have been
analyzed solely by reference to the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage. 10 6 However, had the Court in Blue Chip Stamps actually uti-
lized the text-based methodology suggested by the Central Bank of
Denver majority, it might have reached a different result. Several in-
terpretive questions would arise under such a text-based approach to
Blue Chip Stamps.
Did a "purchase or sale" occur? The answer is yes, for the com-
plaint is based on the plaintiff's exclusion from a transaction that
eventually occurred, albeit with a different purchaser.10 7 Is it neces-
sary for the plaintiff to have actually purchased or sold securities her-
self in order to have been "deceived?" The answer is no, because the
plain meaning of the word "deceit" would appear to include instances
where the defendant's actions dissuaded the plaintiff from participat-
ing in a profitable securities transaction that took place between other108 ,,
parties. Was the deception in connection with" the purchase or
sale that actually took place? The answer is yes, because the entire
purpose of the deception was to exclude the plaintiff from the transac-
tion.' 0 9 Therefore, the plain meaning of the statutory language ap-
pears to be violated by the conduct at issue. 110
the scope of conduct prohibited by Section 10(b), the majority in Central Bank of Denver
stressed that the text of the statute was determinative and downplayed the policy arguments
advanced by the respondents and the SEC. See 511 U.S. at 177-78, 186-89.
104. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
105. See id. at 731.
106. See 511 U.S. at 170-74.
107. Cf. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 283 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that use of word "sale" in RICO civil cause of action need
not be read to require that the plaintiff be a party to an executed sale).
108. Cf Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The facts of this
case, if proved and accepted by the factfinder, surely are within the conduct that Congress in-
tended to ban.").
109. Cf. id. at 764-65, 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. The majority opinion in Blue Chip Stamps appears to recognize that its holding will
operate to eliminate a cause of action on behalf of "plaintiffs who have in fact been damaged by
violations of Rule 10b-5." Id. at 743. But see id. at 733 n.5 (suggesting that the statutory lan-
guage is not violated because fraudulent offers do not constitute a "sale" and because
nonpurchasers cannot be defrauded "in connection with" a sale). The conclusion that the stand-
ing requirement of Blue Chip Stamps serves to bar claims that would otherwise fall within the
statutory language of Section 10(b) is further supported by the observation, made elsewhere by a
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In contrast, the actual holding in Blue Chip Stamps requires that
the plaintiff be a party to a completed purchase or sale in order to
have standing. This holding goes beyond the limitations inherent in
the statutory language, and to the extent that it does so, it is premised
upon policy rationales relating to problems of proof."' A lawsuit
seeking to recover for the plaintiff's fraudulently induced inaction
would, of necessity, rely on the plaintiff's own testimony to a great
degree." 2 Defendants would have little objective evidence available
with which to rebut such testimony. 113 Because it is a simple matter
for anyone to claim, with the benefit of hindsight, that she would have
acted differently had certain facts or assumptions been disclosed, the
potential for abusive litigation is increased where liability is allowed
on the basis of inaction. 1 4 These concerns, and not the construction
of the statutory language alone, influenced the Supreme Court in its
determination that the plaintiff must actually participate in a transac-
tion involving the securities that form the basis of the misstatement or
omission before liability may be imposed." 5 Therefore, the majority
in Blue Chip Stamps explicitly recognized the propriety of using policy
considerations to flesh out the contours of the private cause of action,
even under circumstances where strict adherence to the statutory text
might lead to a different result.
16
Similarly, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,1  the Court used
policy rationales in addition to the statutory text to limit the cause of
action's scope of liability by excluding breaches of fiduciary duty from
the reach of Rule 10b-5.1i The Santa Fe Court ruled that "decep-
tion," as the Court understood the term, did not include conduct by
corporate management that constituted nothing more than a breach of
duty under state law. 119 The Court devoted no more than a con-
clusory two-paragraph discussion to the construction of the statutory
language.120 A much longer discussion was devoted to the justifica-
tion of its holding on the basis of policy rationales: it would defy con-
gressional intent to allow Section 10(b) to be used to police actions
that were essentially violations of fiduciary duty under state law, and
current member of the Court, that the holding of Blue Chip Stamps does not apply to a criminal
prosecution under that Section. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 281 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 947 n.11 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing later characteri-
zations of the Blue Chip Stamps opinion as a policy-driven holding).
112. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 734-35.
113. See id. at 742.
114. See id. at 739-47.
115. See id. at 754-55.
116. See id. at 723.
117. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
118. See id. at 477. While stating that the language of the statute was sufficiently clear to be
dispositive on the issue presented, the Court went on to note "additional [policy] considerations
that weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 for the breach of corpo-
rate fiduciary duty." Id.
119. See id. at 474.
120. See id.
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to permit such a broad scope of liability would encourage vexatious
litigation."' Once again, had the Court applied a purely text-based
approach to the question of what conduct gives rise to liability under
Section 10(b), it would have reached a different result. Indeed, other
decisions by the federal courts have read the term "deception" more
broadly than the Supreme Court's relatively brief discussion in Santa
Fe would indicate.
For example, in Chiarella v. United States, 22 the Supreme Court
held that a preexisting fiduciary duty is necessary before imposing
criminal liability under Section 10(b) for insider trading, strongly sug-
gesting that the source of such a duty may be found in state law. 12 3 It
has been observed, however, that state law did not typically incorpo-
rate a duty to disclose in the insider trading context.124 To a certain
extent, the Court in Chiarella appears to have used state law as an
analogy for delimiting the scope of a federal duty, rather than as an
independent legal standard incorporated into Section 10(b). 25 In sub-
sequent cases outlining the scope of insider trading liability, the lower
federal courts have followed the lead of Chiarella and haveused the
fiduciary duties owed by insiders to shareholders to define conduct
violative of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."-6 Circuit court decisions
adopting the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading have gone
further, reasoning that the "deceptive" conduct prohibited by Section
10(b) should be defined to encompass conduct violative of any of the
defendant's state law duties, not just the duties owed by a corporate
insider.127
Two competing strains of precedent have therefore developed. In
contrast to the narrow reading of "deception" announced earlier in
Santa Fe, which rejects the existence of a uniform federal fiduciary
duty under Section 10(b), the insider trading cases employing the mis-
appropriation theory have, until recently, given the same word a
broader and equally plausible construction that creates federal duties
on the basis of state law in order to define -the boundaries of prohib-
121. See id. at 478-79.
122. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
123. See id. at 229; Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common
Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 IowA J. CoRp. L. 155, 160 (1994).
124. See Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 160 & n.40.
125. See id. at 199.
126. See Mark J, Krudys, Insider Trading by Members of Creditors' Committees-Actiona-
blel, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 127-33 (1994) (discussing lower court cases construing the fiduciary
duties owed by "temporary insiders").
127. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-02 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d
Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); see also
Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 161. The Supreme Court has yet to address the validity of the
misappropriation theory. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
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ited conduct.'28 If these lower court decisions constitute an unwar-
ranted extension of the scope of liability under Section 10(b), the
Supreme Court has only itself-and its seemingly inconsistent inter-
pretation of the same language in Chiarella and Santa Fe-to blame.
As with Blue Chip Stamps, the analysis utilized in the Santa Fe case
cannot be explained exclusively on the basis of the statutory text and,
therefore, it does not fit neatly into the construct outlined in Central
Bank of Denver.
Not only is the analytical approach set forth in the Central Bank
of Denver case an inaccurate description of prior precedent, it fails to
anticipate the possibility that some aspects of Section 10(b) cannot be
categorized exclusively as involving either the scope of liability or an
element of the plaintiff's case.'2 9 For example, the one indication
within the text of Section 10(b) that reveals Congress's view of the
breadth of that section is the language requiring deceptive conduct,
however defined, to be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a
security. The federal courts have long struggled with this phrase. Is
this language a congressional indication of the scope of liability under
the statute? Or does it state a required element of the plaintiff's case?
This language does not appear to fall clearly within either of the two
categories posited by the Court in Central Bank of Denver. There-
fore, it is unclear which of the two alternative interpretive methodolo-
gies described in Central Bank of Denver should be applied in order
to give content to the phrase.
A different result follows depending upon how the issue is cate-
gorized. Most courts considering the "in connection with" language
have treated it as a relatively undemanding element of the plaintiff's
case. 130 It has sometimes been interpreted expansively on the basis of
policy rationales designed to further the remedial purposes of the se-
curities laws. 13  One formulation of the element along these lines,
employed at least once by the Supreme Court, is that in order to es-
tablish that the fraud was "in connection with" the subject transaction,
the plaintiff need only show that the fraudulent conduct "touched" the
purchase or sale of the securities. 132
128. See Nat Stem, The Constitutionalization of Rule 10b-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 15 (1995);
see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (criticizing circuit court opinions
adopting the misappropriation theory for either misinterpreting or ignoring the language of Sec-
tion 10(b)), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953-59 (4th
Cir. 1995) (same).
129. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 887.
130. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 850-
52 (3d ed. 1995); LARRY D. SODEROUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 240-43 (3d
ed. 1996).
131. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 130, at 850-52.
132. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
The case involved a seller of Treasury bonds who received full value for the bonds, but who was
defrauded out of the proceeds. See id. at 8-9. The Court essentially held that the fraud need not
go to the actual security purchased or sold in order to give rise to a cause of action. See also
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However, taking its cue from Central Bank of Denver, a panel of
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan133 recently treated the "in
connection with" language contained in the statute as a limitation
upon the permissible scope of liability under Section 10(b). 134 The
court in Bryan, obviously influenced by the more recent dictates of
the Supreme Court, sought to interpret this language based solely
upon the plain meaning of the text. The Bryan court concluded that
the "in connection with" language imposes a type of privity require-
ment between the fraudulent actor and the person deceived before
the statute can be violated. 135 A panel of the Eighth Circuit recently
reached the same conclusion in United States v. O'Hagan.136
Although Bryan and O'Hagan are insider trading cases, their
text-based interpretations of Section 10(b) rely upon, and are presum-
ably applicable to, cases alleging securities fraud in general. However,
any holding that Section 10(b) does not reach conduct by those who
lack privity with the plaintiff is contradicted by countless previous se-
curities fraud cases that have rejected a privity requirement. 37 The
point is not that Bryan and O'Hagan are rightly or wrongly decided.
The significance of these cases is that they vividly demonstrate how
drawing a distinction between statutory language defining the scope of
liability under Section 10(b) and statutory language defining the ele-
ments of the cause of action, as required by Central Bank of Denver, is
potentially outcome-determinative.
Ultimately, the distinction between the scope of prohibited con-
duct under the cause of action, on the one hand, and the interpreta-
tion of the elements of that cause of action, on the other, is a fine one
which may be incapable of precise definition. The majority opinion in
Central Bank of Denver does not attempt to provide a basis for differ-
entiating between these two categories. However, the consequence of
this distinction is to employ one of two very different methods of in-
terpretation. The utility of any interpretive methodology for Section
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981); William R. McLucas et al., Common
Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAw. 1221, 1236-37
(1996).
133. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
134. See id. at 949-50, 959. The Bryan court's holding rejected the use of the misappropria-
tion theory as a means of defining the boundaries of the prohibition against insider trading. See
id. at 944, 952; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
135. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 n.17, 952; see also O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618. The Bryan court also
suggested that the plain meaning of the word "deception" limits a private plaintiff under Section
10(b) to a purchaser, seller, investor or other person with "a similar stake in an actual or pro-
posed securities transaction." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946.
136. 92 F.3d at 618.
137. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988); Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at
9; McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1996); Baretge v. Barnett, 553 F.2d 290
(2d Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968).
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10(b) that allows courts to depart from prior precedent on the basis of
a seemingly arbitrary categorization is doubtful.
As one might have expected, the history of securities fraud juris-
prudence is somewhat messier than the Central Bank of Denver analy-
sis would have us believe. Perhaps the most damning criticism of the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in that case is that it attempts to
recharacterize earlier precedent in order to conform it with a newly
announced-and very different-method of interpreting Section
10(b). At most, the Supreme Court's decision represents an unjust
attempt to redefine the legal rights available to defrauded investors in
light of current judicial attitudes. 38 At the very least, judicial candor
requires that the majority recognize a major shift in its method of stat-
utory analysis in cases involving securities fraud.1 39 In the section that
follows, this article attempts to sketch an alternative perspective of the
development of the securities fraud cause of action, in contrast to the
characterization of prior precedent contained in Central Bank of
Denver.
B. An Alternative History: How Common-Law Decision Making
Has Defined the Contours of the Rule 10b-5 Cause of
Action
The federal courts have recognized an implied private right of
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for over 50 years.140 The
cause of action was inferred by the courts despite the lack of any lan-
guage in either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 addressing the subject of
private lawsuits and in the absence of any evidence that Congress in-
tended to allow private lawsuits based on violations of Section
10(b). 141 The originators of Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC in
1942, were similarly oblivious to its potential use by private liti-
gants. 42 Therefore, the content of the private cause of action for se-
curities fraud is largely the product of "federal common law."
138. Cf Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. CN. L.
REV. 911, 935 (1996). One critic has characterized the Rehnquist Court as "the most activist
Court in our history on issues of statutory interpretation." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DY-
NAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (1994).
139. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 162, 172-77
(1982); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995);
John J. Kircher, Judicial Candor: Do as We Say, Not as We Do, 73 MARO. L. REV. 421 (1990);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353 (1989); see
also David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
140. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
141. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
142. See id. at 195-96; see also Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton Freeman); Grundfest, supra note 7, at 979-80.
Private litigation under Rule lob-5 has been famously described by Chief Justice Rehnquist as a
"judicial oak" that has grown from a "legislative acorn." See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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1. Importation of Common-Law Elements to Define Securities
Fraud
An analysis of the development of the federal common law of
securities fraud must begin with the language of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.143 The language of each source of the implied right is
similar and equally unhelpful. In terms that are both vague and
broad, these provisions prohibit fraud and deception in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. Beyond the narrow purpose of
eliminating fraudulent practices in connection with securities transac-
tions, it appears that the broader purpose behind both Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is to complement the mandatory disclosure system im-
plemented by the remaining provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts.'1 4 If the overlay of federal law contained within the two Securi-
ties Acts operates as designed, it works as a whole to provide investors
with protection beyond the common law by promoting the full disclo-
sure of those facts essential to the evaluation of an investment
opportunity. 145
The actual language of Section 10(b) prohibits "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors."" Courts have long recognized that the word
"manipulation" is almost a term of art in the securities context and
that Congress had specific practices in mind when it chose to condemn
manipulative conduct in this section. 147 Therefore, to the extent that
the language of Section 10(b) reaches unsavory conduct connected to
a securities transaction that is beyond the scope of manipulation, the
statute reaches only conduct that can be classified as deceptive.
Because Congress-either intentionally or through oversight-
included no express provision for a private cause of action under Sec-
tion 10(b), courts hearing private lawsuits under the section have been
forced to define for themselves just what constitutes deception in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security. In performing this
task, the federal courts are constrained by basic constitutional limits
143. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 197.
144. See Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1413 (stating that "the fundamental purpose of the
federal securities laws and their system of mandatory disclosure" is to eliminate fraud); Seligman
I, supra note 14, at 440; Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (1990).
145. See Thel, supra note 144, at 390; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
147. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 462, 476 (1977). The term "manipula-
tive" refers to "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199. It has
been used to refer to practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices. See Santa Fe,
430 U.S. at 476.
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on their authority. The elements of the plaintiff's case, however de-
fined, cannot allow recovery under Section 10(b) on the basis of con-
duct that is not somehow deceptive. 14 8 To do so would clearly cross
the line from judicial interpretation to lawmaking. 149
The interpretation of Section 10(b) is made all the more difficult
by the fact that the text of the statute "does not forbid anyone from
doing anything."' 50 Congress left to the SEC the task of defining the
actual manipulative and deceptive conduct that would constitute a vi-
olation of the statute. 151 Therefore, in order to further define the pa-
rameters of the private right of action, reference must be made to
Rule 10b-5 as promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the authority
granted to the agency by Section 10(b).
In its broadest terms, Rule 10b-5 prohibits "any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or de-
ceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' 52 However, it is a basic tenet of administrative law that the
reach of Rule 10b-5 as applied cannot extend to conduct that falls
outside of the boundaries of the deceptive conduct that Congress au-
thorized the agency to police under Section 10(b). 153 The Supreme
Court has not hesitated to strike down interpretations of Rule 10b-5
that exceed the scope of the authority granted by Section 10(b).' 5 4
Therefore, the interpretive task faced by a court called to con-
strue the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is a daunting one.
In order to give content to the elements of a private right of action
under 10b-5, federal courts have been forced to look to other areas of
the law. Because the conduct that Congress sought to regulate in the
securities acts involves, in essence, a commercial transaction, it seems
logical that the federal courts chose to borrow the elements of a Rule
10b-5 action from the elements of common-law fraud.'55 State courts
148. With the exception, of course, of conduct that satisfies the relatively narrow definition
of "manipulative" conduct.
149. The Supreme Court's hostile attitude in recent years toward arguments in favor of cre-
ating new implied private rights of action would seem to suggest that the very act of expounding
upon the boundaries of preexisting implied causes of action comes very close to crossing that
same line. However, due to principles of stare decisis and the argument that congressional ac-
quiescence is indicative of legislative approval, it appears unlikely that private litigation under
Rule 10b-5 or any other well-established implied cause of action is in danger of judicial abroga-
tion. Elimination or restriction of existing implied causes of action by Congress is, of course, a
possibility. See infra notes 374-98 and accompanying text.
150. Grundfest, supra note 7, at 978.
151. See id. at 976-80.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
153. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976); see also United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking author-
ity by enacting Rule 14e-3(a) to impose insider trading liability in the absence of a breach of
fiduciary duty).
154. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 979 & n.65 (citing cases).
155. See Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 194; Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrep-
resentations and Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U.
Cnr. L. REv. 667, 707-10 (1991).
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had years of experience in applying the law of fraud to purchases and
sales of a variety of assets. In many respects, it would appear that the
only difference between deception covered by common-law fraud and
deception covered by Rule 10b-5 is the type of asset involved in the
purchase or sale.
A large body of jurisprudence has grown in this area over the last
fifty years, as courts have issued opinions defining the federal com-
mon law of securities fraud.'56 This body of federal common law in-
cludes not only decisions interpreting the scope of Rule 10b-5, but
also decisions interpreting the parallel language contained in Rule
14a-9 dealing with misleading statements or omissions in connection
with a proxy solicitation. Decisions interpreting the content of an ele-
ment of the 14a-9 cause of action have often been considered persua-
sive by courts interpreting a parallel element of the 10b-5 cause of
action, and vice versa. 157 For the most part, Congress has acquiesced
in the experiment of allowing federal courts to develop a federal com-
mon law of securities fraud.
The importation of common-law elements into a securities fraud
cause of action has occasionally proven difficult. The common-law ac-
tion for deceit, as it exists in most states, has five elements: (1) the
plaintiff must have justifiably relied; (2) to her detriment; (3) on a
misrepresentation of material fact; (4) made with scienter by the de-
fendant (either with knowledge as to its falsity or with recklessness as
to its falsity); and (5) made with the intention that the plaintiff rely on
the fact misrepresented. 5 The defects of the common-law action as a
vehicle for combatting securities fraud have been succinctly argued:
First, there was often no affirmative misrepresentation; rather,
the defendant omitted material information when dealing with
the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff was required to prove that the
defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted material information
prior to trading in order to satisfy the fraud requirement of a mis-
representation. A second problem arose from the reliance re-
quirement. Even when a plaintiff could establish a duty to
156. See Musik, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1993)
("The federal courts have accepted and exercised the principal responsibility for the continuing
elaboration of the scope of the 10b-5 right and the definition of the duties it imposes."). Of
course, the very existence of "federal common law" is problematic in light of Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 413-14 (1964) (describing a vision of a "federal
common law of corporate responsibility"). See generally Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 166; Ke-
vin R. Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some Thoughts About Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal
Securities Laws, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1991).
157. See Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1415-16 n.18; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92
F.3d 612, 625 (reading "fraudulent" under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act to be coexten-
sive with the meaning of fraud under § 10(b)), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997). However, this
is not always the case. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir.
1976).
158. See SOLOMON ET AL, supra note 30, at 920.
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disclose, it was difficult to prove that [s]he had relied on the omit-
ted fact. Moreover, the reliance requirement limited actions to
those where the plaintiff and defendant had dealt directly; a
plaintiff could not establish reliance when the transaction oc-
curred through the impersonal medium of a securities
exchange.1
59
Therefore, the federal courts were quickly asked to modify the
harsh effects on the plaintiff's case if the common-law fraud action
was to be used to define the contours of liability for the implied pri-
vate right of action for securities fraud. 6 ° Originally, federal courts
were willing to comply with requests to relax the operation of com-
mon-law fraud elements in the securities context, due to the broad
remedial purposes expressed by Congress when it enacted the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.1 6 ' Although common-law jurisprudence relating
to fraud was imported into Section 10(b) in order to give content to an
otherwise empty vessel, the interpretation given to the elements of the
plaintiff's claim was modified to reflect the unique environment sur-
rounding securities transactions.
Six elements of a private cause of action for securities fraud are
now commonly accepted. Having established standing, the plaintiff in
a private 10b-5 action must establish: (1) in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (2) a material misstatement or omission
of fact; (3) made with scienter; (4) upon which plaintiff relied; (5) that
caused; (6) injury. 6 2 It is instructive to examine how the Supreme
Court has defined the second, fourth, and fifth elements over the past
decades.
a. Material Misstatement or Omission of Fact
For purposes of a private action under Section 10(b), a misstate-
ment or omission of fact is material when there is a "substantial likeli-
hood" that a reasonable investor would consider it important in
making her investment decision or, put differently, where there is a
"substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available.' 1 63 In Basic Inc.
v. Levinson,", the Court explained that the role of the materiality
159. Id.; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988).
160. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 709-10.
161. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38
Aiuz. L. REv. 639, 645 (1996); Lowenfels, supra note 35, at 891-92.
162. But see Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1415 (listing elements as (1) deception, (2) in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) with scienter, (4) by one having a duty to
disclose, (5) with respect to material facts) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 231).
163. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in context
of private action under Rule 14a-9). The TSC Industries standard of materiality was expressly
adopted for actions under Rule lOb-5 in Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
164. 485 U.S. 224.
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requirement is to "filter out essentially useless information,116 5 thus
setting an arguably low threshold for satisfaction of the element.
However, of even greater significance from the perspective of the
Rule 10b-5 plaintiff, is that the materiality standard applied by the
Court is exceedingly fact-specific and, therefore, peculiarly appropri-
ate for application by the trier of fact.166 Under the definition of ma-
teriality adopted, it is difficult for a defendant to negate the element
as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment.1 67
The Supreme Court's latest attempt to interpret the material mis-
statement or omission element occurred in a case arising under the
federal proxy rules. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,16 s the
Supreme Court held that a corporate board's statement of its reasons
for approving a merger plan constituted a misstatement of material
fact that could give rise to private liability under Rule 14a-9.169 The
Court first stated that there was "no serious question" that such a
statement by the board may be materially significant.' 7° The Court
then turned to the question of whether the board's statement could
properly be considered a statement of fact.171 Justice Scalia argued in
dicta that the statement of the board's subjective reasons for acting
would not have constituted a factual statement if it had been preceded
by the phrase "in their estimation.' 72 However, the rationale of the
opinion would not seem to make the determination of whether a
statement was factual in nature turn upon whether the misstatement
was explicitly identified as a statement of opinion. Instead, the hold-
ing provides that a material misstatement of fact may be present
where there is a false statement of subjective belief-a statement in-
herently incapable of independent verification-but only in circum-
stances where (1) the belief or motives stated are not in fact
subjectively held by the speaker, and (2) the statement itself has no
reasonable basis in fact.' 73 Disbelief or undisclosed motivation alone
cannot constitute a material misstatement of fact for purposes of a
private action.' 74
The treatment of the material misstatement or omission prong in
Virginia Bankshares evidences an expansive view of the element. The
165. Id. at 234. But see id. at 231 (stating that the TSC Industries Court was "careful not to
set too low a standard of materiality").
166. See iii at 236, 240.
167. Recently, lower federal courts have seized upon the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a
way to reassert the court's role in determining materiality as a matter of law, at least in the
context of forward-looking information. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj
Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
168. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
169. See id. at 1098.
170. See id. at 1090.
171. See id. at 1091.
172. Id. at 1090.
173. Id. at 1091.
174. See id. at 1096.
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 100 1997
VAGARIES OF THE COMMON LAW
problem presented to the Supreme Court was whether statements of
opinion, motivation, or subjective belief could give rise to a private
action if the statements were not an accurate reflection of the
speaker's true state of mind. A restrictive view of the element might
confine the limits of materiality to objectively verifiable facts, and ex-
clude any statement expressing the state of mind of the speaker.
175
The rationale in support of such a view would be that the audience to
which the statement is addressed knows full well that subjective opin-
ions, motivations, and beliefs constitute the speaker's personal reac-
tion to objective information and, as such, are but one possible
interpretation of the available facts. Justice Scalia appears to be hint-
ing at just such an approach.
By allowing an action to be maintained on the basis of a misstate-
ment of the speaker's state of mind, albeit with some practical limita-
tions imposed due to the inherent problems of proof that arise in this
context, the majority is recognizing the importance that statements of
opinion can play in the context of the total mix of information avail-
able to the audience. The importance of such statements may be mag-
nified in the securities context when the opinions, motivations, or
beliefs expressed are held by insiders with access to more information
than the audience. Therefore, the Court's treatment of the element is
consistent with the relaxation of the requirements of common-law
fraud, with a view toward minimizing the likely problems of proof en-
gendered by the Court's interpretation. 176 The Court's reasoning re-
lies heavily on the policy analysis contained in Blue Chip Stamps as it
seeks to define the material misstatement or omission element in light
of "what is and is not manageable in the litigation of facts.'
177
b. Reliance
At common law, the plaintiff in a fraud action is typically re-
quired to demonstrate the element of reliance.' 78 This requirement
can be satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff either acted or failed to
act as a result of the defendant's misstatement. A necessary prerequi-
site for the existence of reliance at the common law is the plaintiff's
actual knowledge of the misstatement. 179 However, in the context of
175. Justice Scalia noted that, at common law, no action for misrepresentation lies for mis-
statements of belief. See id. at 1110 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 760-62 (5th ed. 1984)); see also HAZEN,
supra note 71, at 801.
176. But see Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1443-44 & n.145 (reading Virginia Bankshares as
a case addressing the element of scienter and concluding that the Court effectively heightened
the burden of proof placed on plaintiffs).
177. 501 U.S. at 1091.
178. See, e.g., Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1993); see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 175, § 105, at 728.
179. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.21 (1988) (quoting KEETON ET AL,
supra note 175, § 105, at 726).
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a securities transaction, the defendant's omission of material facts can
be as misleading as an affirmative misstatement. The Supreme Court
recognized the practical difficulty that a plaintiff would have in prov-
ing reliance on omitted facts and, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 180 held that the 10b-5 plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance in an omission case involving a face-to-face
transaction.18 '
The reliance element was further relaxed in Basic, where the pre-
sumption of reliance was extended to plaintiffs who were not engaged
in a face-to-face transaction with the defendant, so long as the securi-
ties transaction occurred on an efficient market.'" The "fraud on the
market" theory of liability allows a purchaser or seller of stock at a
distorted price to satisfy the element of reliance even where he or she
has no knowledge of the misstatement causing the distortion. 183 The
Court justified this expansion of 10b-5 liability beyond the common
law by pointing out that granting the presumption would promote the
accurate disclosure of information in accord with Congress's purposes
in passing the securities laws, l s4 would avoid the problems of proof in
omission cases described in Affiliated Ute Citizens,185 and would be
consistent with empirical data supporting the hypothesis that security
prices on an efficient market accurately reflect all public information,
including material misstatements. 86
c. Causation
In many ways, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the causa-
tion element provides the underpinnings for both the embrace and
180. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
181. See id. at 153-54.
182. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227.
183. See id. at 241-42.
184. See id. at 245-46 (noting that "Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities
markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's reliance on
the integrity of those markets"). The Court's holding is supported by the apparent need to
provide a remedy to investors who purchase or sell stock at a distorted price. However, it has
been noted that an active trader of a diversified stock portfolio will benefit from price distortions
as often as she is injured by them. See JAMEs D. Cox ET AL, SEcuIrrrEs REGULATION 799
(1991). The rule adopted by the Court may also over-deter the making of inaccurate disclosures.
The liability that the rule creates for the person or entity that misspeaks-a liability that extends
not just to those investors who had knowledge of the misstatement, but to all purchasers or
sellers of stock at the time--can be out of proportion with the severity of the misstatement.
185. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
186. See id. at 246. The validity of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis remains contro-
versial to this date, thereby underscoring the danger of using prevailing economic theory to
justify legal standards. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to
the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory,
Mandatory Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843 (1994); Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not
Efficient, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 341 (1986); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 253-55 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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eventual rejection of the methods employed to define reliance. The
element of causation incorporates both transaction causation (tradi-
tional "but for" causation) and loss causation (the requirement of a
causal link between the fraud and the claimed economic lOSS).187 In
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,188 the Supreme Court reasoned that
the plaintiff in a 14a-9 action should receive a presumption of causa-
tion where the plaintiff demonstrated a material misstatement or
omission in a proxy statement and where the proxy solicitation in gen-
eral was an essential link in the accomplishment of the challenged
transaction. 189 The Court reasoned that, having established the exist-
ence of a material misstatement or omission, it was appropriate to re-
lieve the plaintiff of the difficult burden of proving the fact that the
fraud was the determinative factor in the outcome of the shareholder
vote. 190
In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court was confronted with
the question of whether to extend the Mills presumption to circum-
stances where the majority vote of the shareholders had not been nec-
essary in order to accomplish the challenged transaction.' 91 The
Court refused to do so, holding that the requirement that the plaintiff
prove a loss caused by the defendant's fraud precluded it from
presuming causation in circumstances where the proxy solicitation it-
self was not essential. 92 If a majority vote of the shareholders was not
necessary in order for the defendants to accomplish their goals, then
the fraud could just have easily occurred in the absence of a misstate-
ment in the proxy solicitation. Under such a scenario, the misstate-
ment can hardly be said to have caused plaintiff's injury.
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Virginia Bankshares points out that
the majority's holding departs from the approach that the Court had
originally adopted in Mills.' 93 Justice Kennedy argued that, in light of
the existence of a falsehood in the proxy statement, the Court's prior
interpretation of the elements of a 14a-9 action would support the re-
laxation of the causation requirement in this instance.' 94 He noted
that Mills had relaxed the causation requirement for plaintiffs based
upon the impracticality of proving reliance by thousands of sharehold-
ers in circumstances where it was nonetheless likely that the proxy
violation had contributed to the plaintiffs' damages.' 95 He concluded
187. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1032-39.
188. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
189. Id. at 384-85. In other words, so long as a majority vote of shareholders is necessary to
accomplish the transaction complained of, the Court will presume that the misstatement or omis-
sion caused the majority to vote as they did.
190. See id. at 385.
191. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1100 (1991).
192. See id. at 1102.
193. See id. at 1114 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 1118.
195. See id. at 1116-17.
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that the fact that only a minority of the shareholders were deceived in
Virginia Bankshares did not necessarily reduce the likelihood that the
solicitation of proxies was a causal factor in their injury. 1 96 Therefore,
extension of the presumption of causation under these facts would be
consistent with Mills. In his own dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
suggested that granting a presumption of causation even where the
proxy solicitation was not essential would deter future misstatements,
thereby preserving the shareholders' ability to cast a meaningful vote
and furthering Congress's purpose in passing Section 14 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.197
The majority's adherence to a strict causation requirement in Vir-
ginia Bankshares appears to be a conscious policy choice designed to
prevent causes of action, such as Rule 14a-9 in this case, from becom-
ing insurance policies for investors. Further relaxation of the causa-
tion requirement raises the prospect that shareholders, disappointed
with the outcome of a transaction approved via proxy solicitation,
could scour the solicitation materials for misstatements after the fact
without regard to whether such misstatements had actually led to the
shareholders' economic loss. In making this choice, the Court in Vir-
ginia Bankshares signaled that it would no longer use policy rationales
to extend the already expansive definition of certain elements of the
implied causes of action under the securities laws. 198
d. The Relaxation of Common-Law Fraud Elements
Although it is difficult to find a consistent pattern in the Court's
approach to defining the elements relevant to a 10b-5 action, one re-
curring theme has been the occasional judicial relaxation of elements
drawn from the common law of fraud. Where it has done so, the
Supreme Court has reallocated the burden of proof between the
plaintiff and defendant based on its own assessment of "fairness, pub-
lic policy, . . . probability,... [and] judicial economy."' 199 Thus, the
plaintiff was granted the presumption of reliance in omission cases.2°°
Under the "fraud on the market" theory, reliance was also presumed
when the plaintiff purchased the security on the basis of the market
price, under circumstances where the security trades on an efficient
market, and where a misrepresentation or omission adversely affected
the market price.210 Although the Court has also interpreted certain
elements of the cause of action in a restrictive manner, the cumulative
effect of decisions relaxing the traditional fraud elements made it diffi-
cult for defendants to win summary judgment in securities fraud cases.
196. See id. at 1117-21.
197. See id. at 1112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1104-07.
199. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
200. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
201. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
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The expense and uncertainty attendant with a trial on the merits
therefore created an incentive for defendants to settle prior to trial
and gave the plaintiff a certain degree of leverage in settlement
negotiations.
2. The "New Textualism" in Securities Law Jurisprudence
Following Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court began to
demonstrate a disillusionment with public policy and judicial economy
as the stated basis for decision making in cases involving the private
cause of action. The trend began in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson,2 °2 in which the Court chose to abandon a long-
settled practice of borrowing analogous state-law statutes of limita-
tion.2 °3 Instead, it fashioned a statute of limitations for Section 10(b)
from the language contained in the express causes of action set forth
in the Securities Exchange Act.2 4 The majority did so despite the
misgivings of some members of the Court that the text-derived limita-
tions period did not adequately further the remedial goal of the pri-
vate cause of action.20 5 The Supreme Court continued to search for
meaning in the statutory language, rather than through common-law
principles modified by policy rationales, when it confirmed the exist-
ence of a right to contribution under Section 10(b) in Musick, Peeler &
Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.2 6
Finally, the Supreme Court explicitly embraced textualism as a
guide in interpreting Section 10(b) in the Central Bank of Denver
case.207 "Textualism" is the name given to an approach to statutory
construction that limits itself to the literal reading of the statute, un-
less the statutory text is facially ambiguous or a literal reading leads to
a bizarre result.20 8 Other traditional aids to the interpretation of
texts-"the historical condition.., that gave rise to the statute, and
the propositions of policy, morality, and experience that provide the
social context of the statute or otherwise bear on its subject matter"-
are banned from the inquiry.20 9
The actual holding of the Central Bank of Denver case is that the
absence of any reference to aiding and abetting liability in the text of
Section 10(b) precludes private liability on the basis of such con-
duct.210 The holding represents the first time that the Supreme Court
has relied on the plain language of Section 10(b) to this extent.
Whereas prior cases have read the language contained in the text of
202. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
203. See id. at 359.
204. See id. at 359-61.
205. See id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. 508 U.S. 286, 288 (1993); see id. at 301-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 (1995).
208. See id. at 13.
209. Id.
210. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191-92 (1994).
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Section 10(b) restrictively, such as Chiarella's holding that the use of
the word "deceptive" limited the scope of prohibited conduct,211 Cen-
tral Bank of Denver relies upon the absence of express language in the
Section to narrow the scope of conduct covered by the text.
The above cases illustrate quite graphically that the Supreme
Court's securities jurisprudence has embarked on a new course. 212 As
Professor Eisenberg has pointed out, the majority in Central Bank of
Denver could have chosen to write an opinion that abolished aiding
and abetting liability in private actions on the basis of policy rationales
such as the tendency of secondary liability under the securities laws to
encourage vexatious litigation.213 Instead, the majority rejected this
opportunity and made it clear that policy considerations would hence-
forth play little role in the interpretation of Section 10(b).214 The
Court implemented its change in direction without overruling or ex-
plicitly criticizing that segment of precedent defining the boundaries
of the cause of action in policy terms. In fact, in Central Bank of Den-
ver, the Court claimed to find authority for its new course by citing to
the very body of precedent that the majority rejected in favor of a
completely different methodology.21 5
The result of this shift in securities law jurisprudence is that a
preexisting body of precedent under Rule 10b-5 must coexist with fu-
ture decisions premised on the new textualism. The coexistence of
two contradictory bodies of precedent will result in a schizophrenic
map of the boundaries of securities fraud, where the factors determin-
ing the parameters of the cause of action are a hybrid of policy-ori-
ented rationales and text-derived limitations.
IV. THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
UNDER RULE 1OB-5
A. The Vagaries of the Common Law
The combination of a standard of liability defined via a process of
federal common law with an otherwise integrated and industry-spe-
cific statutory scheme has been a failure. The use of the federal com-
mon law to determine the scope of private liability under the
securities laws has had two negative results. First, it has subjected the
substantive scope of securities fraud liability to the vagaries of the
common-law process. As a result, the cause of action has developed
several internal inconsistencies. Second, it has allowed the substantive
211. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
213. See Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 19-20.
214. See id. at 20.
215. Cf. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 55-56, 132-33 (1988)
(discussing "transformation": an approach to common-law decision making where courts radi-
cally reconstruct precedent in order to overturn the rules announced by prior holdings while at
the same time purporting to follow the earlier cases).
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standards of liability to evolve without appropriate fidelity to the
overall structure of the securities laws as initially designed by Con-
gress. Neither a policy-based nor a text-based interpretation of Sec-
tion 10(b) has succeeded in fully integrating a judicially defined
private cause of action for securities fraud into the overall system of
securities regulation crafted by Congress.
It is possible that the existence of an express cause of action
under Section 10(b) would not have foreclosed this same result. Even
in the case of the most explicit congressional text, it can be argued
that statutory interpretation by the judiciary is a "dynamic" process
that rightly abandons original intent in order to update a statute in
light of subsequent legal developments and contemporary legislative
preferences. 216 "Dynamic statutory interpretation" is not a theory
that seeks to explain how courts approach the task of statutory inter-
pretation. Rather, it is a descriptive model that asks us to accept the
fact that courts inevitably modify and develop statutory rights and ob-
ligations in response to a shifting social reality. 17 The proponents of
dynamic statutory interpretation might argue that the judicial power,
however employed, would inevitably subject an express private cause
of action under Section 10(b) to an equally unpredictable course.
However, dynamic statutory interpretation can be criticized as a
model of judicial decision making on the grounds that it contravenes
several fundamental principles underlying the appropriate role of the
courts: (1) it is the prerogative of Congress to decide when changed
circumstances merit the updating of a congressionally created right;
(2) judges are incapable of accurately determining original legislative
intent, and therefore any updating by the judiciary is inevitably a
political act best left to Congress; (3) judicial attempts to update a
congressionally created right risk the overenforcement of that right in
areas best left to the common law; (4) continuity in legal obligations is
preferable to change outside of the democratic process; and (5) the
public has relied upon prior judicial interpretations in ordering its
conduct.218
Whether or not these principles weigh heavily enough to counsel
in favor of judicial restraint in the interpretation of an express cause of
action, they do provide persuasive grounds for resisting the use of fed-
eral common law to significantly reshape a judicially implied cause of
action. In the absence of explicit congressional direction in the legis-
lative language or history, the vagaries of federal common law do vio-
216. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 9-10; see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpreta-
tion and the Idea of Progress, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 1546, 1553-55 (1996).
217. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 6.
218. See id. at 130-40. Professor Eskridge would argue that judicial innovations that do
violence to these principles are unlikely if judges approach the problem of statutory interpreta-
tion in a pragmatic fashion. See id. at 109; Farber, supra note 216, at 1556-57; see also CALA-
BRESI, supra note 139, at 163-66.
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lence to these principles in ways that differ, if not in kind, then in
degree from the usual process of statutory interpretation. If, as some
have argued, the concept of dynamic statutory interpretation in gen-
eral is "unjust," '2 1 9 then it is doubly so when the courts interpret an
implied cause of action in a dynamic fashion.
When Congress explicitly creates a cause of action, it implicitly
delegates a degree of authority to the judiciary to interpret the cause
of action in a manner designed to maintain the efficient operation of
the cause of action in the face of changing circumstances. However,
when an implied cause of action is found by the judiciary, it is fiction
to suggest that any conscious "delegation" of congressional authority
to update the cause of action has occurred. Nor can congressional
failure to overturn an implied cause of action, once its existence is
established, be deemed to constitute a delegation of authority to the
judiciary. Until Congress passes explicit statutory language setting
forth a cause of action, that body has not performed any deliberative
act from which one can derive a conscious desire to do anything.
In addition, courts engaged in the dynamic interpretation of an
implied right of action must do so with even less indicia of legislative
intent than a court interpreting an explicit cause of action. It is cer-
tainly true that courts are incapable of using statutory text or legisla-
tive history as infallible guideposts to discover original intent.
However, in the case of an explicit cause of action, these sources at
least provide the court with a map of the boundaries within which
original intent must lie.
Courts interpreting an implied cause of action do so on a map of
their own making. The less legislative guidance available to inform
the court's interpretation of a statute, the more the court is called
upon to perform a political function when it updates the law in re-
sponse to the exigencies of the present day.220 Statutory interpreta-
tion therefore can more easily devolve into judicial legislation that
unwisely expands the cause of action to the detriment of common-law
rules. For similar reasons, the judicial interpretation of an implied
cause of action is also more likely to frustrate the public's reliance
upon well-established legal doctrine. Lacking any evidence of legisla-
tive intent or purpose to cabin their discretion, judges may be unable
to resist abandoning a settled construction of the language giving rise
to the cause of action.
219. See D'Amato, supra note 138, at 935.
220. See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 367
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe ... that Congress, rather than the Federal Judiciary,
has the responsibility for making the policy determinations that are required in rejecting a rule
selected under the doctrine of state borrowing, long applied in § 10(b) cases, and choosing a new
limitations period and its associated tolling rules.").
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B. Dueling Policy Rationales in the Arena of Judge-Made Law
The use of federal common law to give content to the elements of
a 10b-5 cause of action originally led the federal courts to rely heavily
on policy arguments as a basis for constructing the cause of action.
The language of Section 10(b) does not, by its own terms, prohibit
anything, and there is no legislative history that explicates the appro-
priate scope of private liability. The Supreme Court has often stated
that its task in construing the private cause of action is to infer what
Congress would have done if it had considered the specific element at
issue.22' It is therefore inevitable that policy arguments play a critical
definitional role in the securities fraud context because the vague lan-
guage2 2 utilized by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the broad pur-
pose of Congress,223 can be construed to support a host of alternative
definitions of the elements of the plaintiff's case.
Individual court decisions interpreting the private cause of action
have traditionally vacillated between a desire to promote two distinct
policy goals. One goal is the overarching congressional purpose, in
light of the conduct widely held to have contributed to the Stock Mar-
ket Crash of 1929, to enact federal law that would protect investors
and remedy similar abuses.224 The second policy goal is one of judicial
self-preservation: the need to prevent frivolous litigation that wastes
judicial and social resources and that threatens the integrity of the
court system.225
Prior to the emergence of a text-based interpretation of Section
10(b), a touchstone that courts often utilized to choose between two
alternative formulations of the private cause of action was the desire
to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Securities Exchange Act.
This policy rationale sometimes led federal courts to adopt expansive
221. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294
(1993); cf EsKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 13-14 (criticizing attempts at "statutory archaeology").
222. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing Rule 10b-5 as "notori-
ously vague"); Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It Is an Inkblot We Are Ex-
pounding: Section 10(b) as a Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 41, 41 (1995) (noting that the
language of § 10(b) possesses "no intrinsic meaning but ... must be plumbed for deeper
consequence").
223. In a well-known book, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that the assumed
purpose of Congress, the protection of investors, is an illusory goal that need not be promoted
by our securities laws. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 296-98 (1991). Their argument that many capital markets are
efficient in the semistrong form leads them to reject the present structure of mandatory disclo-
sure laws as a necessary means of achieving investor confidence in capital markets or as a neces-
sary means of protecting unsophisticated investors. See id. at 303. See generally Cunningham,
supra note 42, at 1449-51 (critiquing the argument of Easterbrook and Fischel). It need only be
noted that the debate over the validity of the original purpose of the securities laws further
undermines the utility of that purpose as the sole touchstone for determining the boundaries of
securities fraud.
224. See Thel, supra note 144, at 409-13.
225. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); see also
Phillips & Miller, supra note 24, at 1023-27.
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interpretations of the 10b-5 elements where such an interpretation
was viewed as the alternative most likely to deter and punish fraud.226
However, the goal of adopting substantive rules designed to protect
investors is a slippery one. An infinite set of legal rules could be justi-
fied as useful in furtherance of this goal. Indeed, prohibiting securities
transactions altogether would undoubtedly prevent some investors
from being defrauded. A broad goal such as the protection of inves-
tors is meaningless in the abstract.227
Instead, the federal goal of protecting securities investors must be
viewed in the context of the legal protections available in the absence
of federal regulation. It is reasonable to conclude that, at a minimum,
Congress intended to use federal law as a vehicle to protect investors
in circumstances where existing state law was inadequate.228 For
many years, courts tasked with interpreting the implied private right
of action under Section 10(b) have found that the overall goal of pro-
tecting investors could be advanced by the relaxation of previously
existing state-law limitations on a fraud action.229
Congress was explicit that the securities laws were not intended
to completely displace state law. There is no indication that, in pass-
ing Section 10(b), Congress intended to construct a vehicle for com-
batting fraud that had no relation whatsoever to the established
contours of a common-law cause of action.23° Over time, however,
the combination of lawmaking via a federal common-law process and
fidelity to the broad goal of investor protection promoted an evolu-
tion of the 10b-5 cause of action, until certain elements became mere
shadows of their common-law fraud counterparts. The erosion of the
reliance requirement is a striking example. The "watering down" of
state common-law limitations imported into the securities context
eventually ceased, and judicial skepticism concerning the wisdom of
relaxing the traditional elements of common-law fraud reached its
height in the Virginia Bankshares case.231 By then, however, the dam-
age was already done.
Plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' bar, rationally moved to take advan-
tage of a federal cause of action that lacked the stringent standards
226. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (arguing that the
language of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be read "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purposes") (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963)).
227. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 29 ("An attributed policy purpose is too general and
malleable to yield interpretive closure in specific cases, for its own application depends on con-
text and the interpreter's perspective.").
228. See generally Jeffrey B. Bartell, Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Securities
Code, 32 VAND. L. REV. 457, 462-63 (1979); Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 213.
229. See supra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
230. See Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 195-96; see also id. at 198 (in the securities law con-
text, "[s]tate law ... plays a role in suggesting the shape of federal law" due to the desire of
federal judges to give "'traditional' realms of state law their fullest possible effectuation").
231. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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that state courts had used to prevent themselves from being overrun
by fraud actions. Over time, the federal courts' adherence to a reme-
dial policy rationale as an interpretive touchstone, on even an occa-
sional basis, aggravated the already existing conditions that made the
cause of action susceptible to the proliferation of nonmeritorious law-
suits. In this manner, interpretations of the cause of action intended
to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of Congress had the cumu-
lative effect of strengthening a dueling policy concern.
The federal courts have long attempted to give content to the se-
curities fraud cause of action in light of the desire to prevent frivolous
litigation from clogging the courts and intimidation of legitimate busi-
nesses. On many occasions, the Supreme Court has expressed con-
cern over the special potential for vexatious litigation that exists under
the federal securities laws.232 Sometimes, the Supreme Court recog-
nized this potential even as it was adopting an expansive view of the
statute due to countervailing policy concerns in favor of investor pro-
tection. In later years the Court demonstrated, on a more consistent
basis, its willingness to act on the fear of vexatious litigation and adopt
substantive legal rules intended to reduce securities fraud litigation in
federal courts. 233 In Virginia Bankshares, a case under Rule 14a-9, it
seemed that the Court drew a line in the sand indicating its reluctance
to further relax traditional common-law elements.234 The Court sig-
naled that the desire to prevent vexatious litigation would henceforth
trump Congress's broad goal of investor protection.
In more recent opinions interpreting Section 10(b), the Supreme
Court has avoided an explicit weighing of these dueling policy ratio-
nales as the stated basis for its decision making. Overdependence on
policy rationales might be perceived by observers as nothing more
than legislation by the judiciary, which is reason enough for the rejec-
tion of this approach by certain current members of the Court. It also
opens the Court to charges that its decisions are driven by the ideol-
ogy of its members. In addition, an interpretive approach that relies
upon two competing policy rationales cannot consistently promote
either one.
Instead, the Supreme Court has chosen to redefine the previously
accepted boundaries of the securities fraud cause of action on the ba-
sis of a textualist approach to the construction of the statute. The
232. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); see also
Johnson, supra note 34, at 439 n.114.
233. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 437-39 (citing to Supreme Court opinions which have
served to reduce litigation in the areas of securities fraud, bankruptcy, and environmental regu-
lation, and noting a similar trend in the Court's recent immigration law opinions).
234. See Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1115 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("To the extent the Court's analysis considers the purposes underlying § 14(a), it
does so with the avowed aim to limit the cause of action and with undue emphasis upon fears of
,speculative claims and procedural intractability.' . . . The result is a sort of guerilla warfare to
restrict a well-established implied right of action.").
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Supreme Court's new textualism leads to a restrictive reading of the
scope of conduct actionable under Section 10(b), 235 one that carries
the added benefit of reducing the volume of private securities fraud
litigation in federal court. The practical effect of the Supreme Court's
interpretive shift has been to force the lower federal courts to retreat
from imposing liability within boundaries that are defined by the dis-
tinct policy rationales discussed above. Actionable conduct, and the
classes of defendants subject to liability, are now defined by the plain
meaning of the text without reference to policy goals.
C. The Persistence of Ideology
1. Why Textualism as Employed Is Not Value Neutral
Notwithstanding the absence of any explicit reliance on policy ar-
guments in its textualist approach, the adoption of this new method
for interpreting Section 10(b) should not mask the fact that policy ra-
tionales continue to influence the manner in which textualism is em-
ployed in the securities fraud area.236 For example, the proponents of
textualism concede that an interpretation limited to the plain meaning
of the text need not be given effect where the result is "so bizarre"
that Congress must have intended otherwise.237 It hardly bears noting
that the determination that a particular statutory construction leads to
a bizarre result is a uniquely subjective determination, and one that
ultimately turns on the court's view of the policies that Congress
sought to promote.238
It also appears that, rather than being a "value neutral" method
of statutory interpretation, textualism as employed in the interpreta-
tion of Section 10(b) provides a vehicle to "cast in stone" the Court's
235. See Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 13; Stephen Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textual-
ism, 40 VILL L. REV. 93 (1995); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622-27 (8th Cir.
1996) (adhering to plain language of Section 14(e) results in a restrictive interpretation of the
conduct subject to SEC regulation under that provision), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
236. See Grundfest, supra note 222, at 43.
237. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994); see also Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 28 (calling the bizarre result exception "fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the concept of strict textualism").
238. See ESKR1DGE, supra note 138, at 45-46. In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061
(1995), four members of the Court found nothing bizarre about the conclusion that liability for a
misstatement in a prospectus under Section 12 of the Securities Act could extend to written
communications in a secondary securities transaction. See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Such an interpretation, based on the language of the text, would have significantly expanded the
conduct .subject to the 1933 Act without any evidence that Congress sought to reach secondary
transactions with that legislation. See id. at 1068. This result also would have created an anom-
aly whereby oral misstatements were actionable under Section 12 only in the context of a pri-
mary transaction but written misstatements were actionable regardless of whether they occurred
in a primary or secondary transaction. See also id. at 1068. Given the willingness of the minority
in Gustafson to accept the above result as a logical requirement of the text's language, one must
question whether the proponents of a textualist interpretation of the securities laws will ever
conclude that a textualist result is sufficiently bizarre to merit its avoidance. See id. at 1074
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (declining to explore the logical implications of a textualist reading of
§ 12(2), stating that "[olur job is simply to apply the [congressional] policy, not to question it").
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move toward a more restrictive reading of the statute. It makes un-
likely any future reascendancy of an interpretation heavily influenced
by the broad remedial purposes of the Securities Exchange Act.239
Textualism by itself, as a method of statutory interpretation, need not
preordain either a restrictive or an expansionist result. Yet the very
fact that it can be employed differently in different contexts raises the
prospect that unspoken policy rationales are still driving the interpre-
tive process. A skeptical observer might question whether the choice
of textualism as an interpretive approach is merely a means to an
end.240
For example, the Supreme Court's own decisions in other areas of
the law illustrate that textualism can sometimes result in an expan-
sionist interpretation of statutory language. The Court's most recent
textualist interpretations241 of the RICO242 statute, which have con-
tributed to a string of decisions establishing an expansive scope of
conduct actionable under that section,243 contrast sharply with the
shrinking scope of the securities fraud cause of action under a similar
textualist approach. In the RICO context, the Supreme Court ap-
pears reluctant to exclude any conduct from the ambit of "racketeer-
ing activity" in the absence of explicit direction in the statutory
language. In the context of Section 10(b), the Court appears reluctant
239. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 300-03 (arguing that a recognition of the limits of
judicial resources has increasingly influenced the Rehnquist Court in its adoption of canons of
statutory construction).
240. In support of its holding in Central Bank of Denver, the majority noted that the demise
of aiding and abetting liability would diminish the potential for vexatious litigation and would
decrease the fees charged to start-up companies by professionals who would otherwise be wary
of secondary liability. 511 U.S. at 189. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 44
("[C]urrent values, including those widely shared as well as those more particular to the inter-
preter, will influence any interpreter's approach to the statutory text.")
241. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257-61 (1994); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993). But see Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992) (eschewing the plain meaning of the RICO statute in favor of an
interpretation dictated by "statutory history"); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 238-39 (1989) ("For any more specific guidance as to the meaning of 'pattern,' we must look
past the text to RICO's legislative history, as we have done in prior cases construing the Act.").
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
243. See National Org. for Women, 510 U.S. at 257 ("Nowhere in either § 1962(c), or in the
RICO definitions in § 1961, is there any indication that an economic motive is required.");
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 279-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although the words 'injury in [one's]
business or property' and 'by reason of' are words of limitation, they do not categorically ex-
clude nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities from the universe of RICO plaintiffs."); see also
United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (declining to read jurisdictional limit
into statutory language); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) ("If the defend-
ant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [§ 1962's] provisions,
and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a
claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional... require-
ment."); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 359 (1994).
But see Reves, 507 U.S. at 177-79. For an argument that the Central Bank of Denver case fore-
shadows a shift to a similarly restrictive textualist approach to the RICO statute, see Taurie M.
Zeitzer, In Central Bank's Wake, RICO's Voice Resonates: Are Civil Aiding and Abetting Claims
Still Tenable?, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 551 (1996).
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to include any conduct within the ambit of "a deceptive device or con-
trivance" absent an explicit order to do so in the statutory language.2 "
The words used to describe the prohibited conduct under the re-
spective statutory sections-"deceptive device or contrivance" and
"pattern of racketeering activity"-are each sufficiently broad and
ambiguous to belie the argument that textualism alone accounts for
the restrictive interpretation of the former and the expansive defini-
tion of the latter.245 Something more is at work. The merits of the
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, its fidelity to congres-
sional intent, and the concomitant avoidance of judicial "lawmaking"
are undermined where the judiciary approaches the congressional lan-
guage with a different predisposition under different circumstances.
The primary distinction between the Section 10(b) and RICO
statutory sections is that the RICO private cause of action is an ex-
press creation of Congress, whereas the judiciary has implied the pri-
vate cause of action for securities fraud.2 6 It is unclear, however, why
this distinction, in and of itself, should influence an avowedly textualist
approach to construing the statutory language. The premise of a tex-
tualist approach to statutory construction is a basic fidelity to the plain
meaning of the statutory text as the primary, if not the only, evidence
2471 oof legislative intent and purpose. It is not obvious that questions
concerning the court's view of the "legitimacy" of the cause of action
should play any role in a textualist reading of the statutory language.
The legitimacy or illegitimacy of an implied cause of action can-
not be derived from the specific statutory provision at issue; if it could,
the cause of action would be an express one. Instead, legitimacy or
illegitimacy can be determined only in context. The legislative history
of the Securities Exchange Act, including amendments in 198824 and1991249 that seem to accept the existence of an implied right of ac-
244. Cf Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ad-
vocating a textualist interpretation of § 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act that would expand its
coverage due to the absence of limiting language).
245. Cf McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). In construing the mail fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1341, the McNally court stated: "Rather than construe the statute in a manner that
leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards
of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in
scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more
clearly than it has." Id. at 360; see also United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1436-40, reh'd en
banc granted, 91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
246. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 300 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that prior interpretations of § 10(b) evidence a "restrained
approach to implied remedies"); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 289 (Scalia, J., concurring) (justifying the
distinction between the RICO and 10b-5 standing requirement on the basis that the latter is an
implied cause of action).
247. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 34.
248. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677.
249. Securities Exchange Act § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994).
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tion,25 ° must be considered. The general practice and history of courts
in implying remedies for violations of federal statutes at the time of
Section 10(b)'s enactment is relevant to the question. The long-held
position of the SEC, that private litigation is a necessary tool to en-
force the overall congressional scheme, is an important factor. An in-
dividual judge's personal view as to the social benefits versus the
social costs of private litigation also will weigh in the determination of
legitimacy.
Considered in context, the question of the "legitimacy" of the im-
plied cause of action under Section 10(b) has long been subject to
debate. Any canon of construction seeking to justify a restrictive
reading of Section 10(b) on the basis that-as an implied cause of
action-it is somehow illegitimate must, of necessity, incorporate and
rely upon the very objects of judicial subjectivity that textualism seeks
to avoid. The meaning of the words employed by Congress are a con-
stant; the variables are judicial attitudes concerning the circumstances
under which a private cause of action should be implied to redress
injury caused by a violation of the congressional language where such
a cause of action is not explicitly created. 251 In order to be true to its
principles, a textualist interpretation of Section 10(b) should be em-
ployed without regard to questions concerning the legitimacy of the
text.252
2. Textualism and the Legitimacy of the Cause of Action
The distinction between implied and express causes of action
does appear to make a difference in the use of a textual approach to
interpretation, if for no other reason than the ill favor with which im-
plied private causes of action under federal law are currently viewed
by the Supreme Court.2 53 Private litigation under Rule 10b-5 is but
one of dozens of judicially created remedies for individuals injured by
250. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 994-98 (criticizing the argument that these two statutory
amendments constitute evidence of legislative acquiescence to the existence of a private right of
action).
251. Cf. Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 178. In discussing the manner in which federal courts
have answered questions concerning their own ability to "make law" in the absence of congres-
sional authority, Professor Gabaldon concludes that "[i]deology.. . seems more promising than
judicial precedent as a guide to the resolution selected by any decision-maker." Id.
252. Compare Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 300
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("How a particular private cause of action may have emerged
should not weaken our vigilance in the subsequent interpretation and application of that action.
Our inquiries into statutory text, congressional intent, and legislative purpose remain intact.")
with Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
think [the 14a-9] cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress... and hence the
more narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we are to our
task.").
253. See Plass, supra note 235, at 101 ("In practice, [textualism] is a malleable theory subject
to variation and manipulation and can be applied with as much or as little consistency as a
particular judge chooses."); cf. Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 196-97.
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a violation of federal law.254 It is an example of the federal judiciary's
response to the explosive growth of congressional legislation in the
first half of this century: a judicial attitude that strived to find a rem-
edy for every injury in violation of congressional policy. Under statu-
tory tort theory, a defendant's violation of a statute is unreasonable
conduct, and recovery will be had where the plaintiff is a member of
the class the statute was intended to protect.255 The very first federal
court to recognize the implied private right of action under Section
10(b) based its holding upon a statutory tort analysis.256 Although the
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether an
implied private right of action is proper under Section 10(b), it has
accepted the existence of the 10b-5 right of action as an unalterable
part of the federal judicial landscape.257
From the outset, the standards for creating an implied private
right of action were unclear, even if the judicial power to do so had
not yet come into question. The circumstances under which a private
cause of action was to be implied by the federal judiciary were finally
specified in Con v. Ash.258 In subsequent years, the Cort test was
sharply limited as the federal courts came to question whether judi-
cially created remedies constituted judicial legislation in contravention
of the courts' constitutional role.259 In addition, the courts increas-
ingly began to doubt the wisdom of creating implied private rights of
action as they grappled with crowded dockets, discovery wars, and the
254. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,433 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme Court
implied a private right of action for a violation of the federal proxy rules from Section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the argument that the language of Section 27 makes no
specific reference to a private right of action. The Court rejected a textualist reading of the
statute because, among other reasons, the availability of judicial relief was necessary to achieve
Congress's broad remedial purpose (to protect investors) in regulating the solicitation of proxies.
See id. at 434-35. Another policy rationale supporting the Court's decision in Borak was the
need to supplement government enforcement of the proxy rules with the deterrent effect of
private litigation. See id. at 432.
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
256. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon
court relied upon Restatement of Torts § 286 and Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1916), for the proposition that the violation of a statute can give rise to tort liability. Kardon,
69 F. Supp. at 513.
257. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); see
also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994).
258. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort decision created a four-part test to determine whether
federal courts should recognize an implied private fight of action premised upon a violation of a
federal statute. See id. at 78. The factors to be considered were: (1) whether the plaintiff was a
part of the special class on whose behalf the statute was passed; (2) whether there was any
evidence of legislative intent to create a private remedy; (3) whether the creation of a private
right of action is consistent with the underlying legislative scheme; and (4) whether the asserted
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law. See id
259. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). The Supreme Court seems intent on avoiding the
implication of future private rights of action unless there is evidence of an explicit legislative
intent that the federal courts create such a remedy. See Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 174.
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other inevitable burdens visited upon the limited resources of the fed-
eral court system by an ever-expanding pool of federal remedies.
Today, newly implied private causes of action under federal law
are a rare spectacle indeed.2 6° However, the private cause of action
under Rule 10b-5, as well as certain other causes of action implied
under federal law in the years prior to retrenchment, remain an estab-
lished part of the legal landscape.26' They seem destined to survive
eternally under principles of stare decisis and the theory that legisla-
tive acquiescence toward their existence constitutes approval of the
implied private right.2
62
Inevitably, an occasional dispute concerning the boundaries of
these previously recognized implied private rights of action will reach
the Supreme Court. In resolving such a dispute, the members of the
current Court have no choice but to confront the body of judge-made
law that serves as precedent. So long as the Court's holding leaves in
place the implied private right of action, the Court cannot avoid the
process of "making law," a process that must be embarrassing and
distasteful to any self-proclaimed judicial conservative.263 These un-
wanted implied causes of action are like the bastard children of a Vic-
torian gentleman: they reappear from time to time on the Supreme
Court's doorstep to demand its attention and to call into question the
legitimacy of the majority's conservative self-image.
D. The Vagaries of the Common Law Lead to a Troublesome
Destination
Different policy arguments appeal to different judges, as evi-
denced by the changing judicial perspectives that have influenced the
content of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action over time.264 Certain ele-
260. See Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 98 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to find implicit private right of action in Securities Exchange Act § 11A(c)(5)); Arst v.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 86 F.3d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to find implied private cause of
action under Rule 10b-10(a)(7)(i)); Feins v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 81 F.3d 1215 (2d Cir.
1996) (refusing to find implied private right of action on behalf of persons denied membership
on stock exchange) (discussed in Court Dismisses Suit Challenging Amex on Transfer of Seat,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1996, at B7).
261. In addition to the implied private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
courts have found the existence of an implied cause of action under the following sections of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act: § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(I) (1994); § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a); and § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). See generally Grundfest, supra note 7, at 964 n.3.
262. See Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 174-75.
263. See id. at 166 (observing that criticism of federal common law is founded on issues
relating to separation of powers and federalism); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365-66 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining in the adoption
of a statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions based on the model of the express causes of action
contained elsewhere in the statute, but noting dryly that "[w]e are imagining here").
264. Legal realists contend that the holding in any given case is inevitably influenced by the
background and world view of the individual judge deciding the case. See William H. Page,
Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1 (1995). However, judges
have greater discretion to self-select the governing policy rationales in the development of com-
mon-law rules than they possess in the interpretation of statutes, where the court must account
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ments of the private cause of action have been defined expansively, in
a manner benefitting potential plaintiffs, because judges at the time of
these decisions accepted the policy argument that the deterrent pur-
pose of the securities laws was best achieved by granting the protec-
tions of Rule 10b-5 to the largest class of investors possible.265 The
cause of action has been interpreted more restrictively in recent years,
benefitting potential defendants.2 66 The prevailing attitude among the
Justices of the Supreme Court today appears to be that nonmeritori-
ous strike suits must be avoided at all costs, even if some valid claims
are lost due to a restrictive interpretation of the element.267 Prece-
dent interpreting Rule 10b-5 can thus be viewed as a river, twisting
and turning as it approaches the finality of a Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on each element, and sometimes taking unexpected
turns.268 This is what is meant by the expression "vagaries of federal
common law."
The "ebb and flow"' 2 69 of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence as it occurs in
the lower courts has been accepted by many scholars.27 ° Professor
Lawrence Cunningham described this process as follows:
Judicial innovations in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence by the lower fed-
eral courts tend to respect existing parameters, although they re-
fine the contours in significant ways. So long as those
refinements respect and advance the purposes of the federal se-
curities laws in doctrinally and theoretically defensible ways and
in accordance with the principles developed by the Supreme
Court, they are acceptable. Indeed, in many instances such judi-
cial innovation has been a necessary and appropriate step in the
60 year evolution of Rule 10b-5. Criticism is warranted when
for the particular policy values reflected in the statutory text. See EISENBERG, supra note 215, at
29.
265. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Lowenfels, supra note
35, at 891-92.
266. See Stem, supra note 128, at 2.
267. See also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1105-06 (1991) (conclud-
ing that risk of strike suits, protracted discovery, and self-serving testimony justifies the interpre-
tation of § 14(a) so as to avoid speculative claims in general, even though the plaintiffs' claims in
the instant case may have merit).
268. Professor Grundfest has characterized the judicial precedent in regards to Rule lOb-5
as follows: "Although a substantial body of judicial precedent supports the implied private right,
that precedent is far from uniform, is not well-reasoned, and is rife with contradiction."
Grundfest, supra note 7, at 985. Elsewhere it has been noted that "the jurisprudential history of
the rule is one of fits and starts-romantic times of doctrinal invention and ad hoc subjectivity
rhythmically giving way to a classical emphasis on predictability, notice, and order-in a way
characteristic of the common law generally." Cox ET AL., supra note 184, at 719. See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, Rule lOb-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. S-7, S-15
(1993) ("The process of adaptation in the jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 is constant; it is only the
direction of this adaptation that is difficult to discern.").
269. See S. Scott Lutton, The Ebb and Flow of Section 10(b) Jurisprudence: An Analysis of
Central Bank, 17 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 45, 47 (1994) (describing the antithetical relation-
ship between strict Supreme Court constructions of § 10(b) and ameliorative interpretations that
are still prevalent among the lower federal courts).
270. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 867.
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such innovation leads numerous courts to articulate the applica-
ble standards in a radically new way that fails to respect or ad-
vance the purpose of the rules in defensible ways or in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent. 271
By this standard, the recent innovations of the Supreme Court
itself warrant criticism. The Supreme Court's doctrinal change of
course in embracing a textualist reading of Section 10(b) goes beyond
a lower court's refinement of the undeveloped "contours" of the cause
of action, and instead constitutes a substitution of new principles for
the previous tenets used to guide judicial decision making in the area.
Of course, the Supreme Court need not treat its own precedent with
the same deference expected from the lower federal courts. It also
may be unsurprising that the interpretation of a federal statute should
change over time.272
However, the absence of any meaningful text or legislative his-
tory to cabin its discretion gives the Supreme Court the ability to
make more radical innovations in the interpretation of Section 10(b)
than is possible in the typical exercise of statutory interpretation. The
freedom inherent in declaring principles of federal common law,
rightly viewed with suspicion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,273 can
easily lead to abuse. At first glance, the move toward a textualist in-
terpretation of Section 10(b) appears to be an attempt to sever all ties
with the methodologies that have allowed prior precedent to develop
with such twists and turns. However, the move toward textualism is,
itself, a new twist resulting from changed judicial attitudes. By shift-
ing to a textualist approach, the Supreme Court is contributing to the
vagaries of the federal common law of securities fraud and, unfortu-
nately, directing us toward a particularly troublesome destination.274
The abandonment of a well-developed body of precedent creates
uncertainty as to the legal rules that will govern future conduct.275
The financial services industry, in particular, is an industry in which it
is vital for the market participants to know their potential legal liabil-
ity at the outset, in order to gauge potential risk and expected costs. 2 7 6
271. Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1413 n.8.
272. See ESKRDGE, supra note 138, at 11 ("Over time, the interpreter's perspective diverges
from that of the statute as a result of changed circumstances which give rise to unanticipated
problems, developments in law and the statute's evolution, and different political and ideological
frameworks.").
273. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (abolishing the concept of a general federal common law).
274. See also EISENBERG, supra note 215, at 74 ("A legal rule whose [common-law] develop-
ment follows a jagged path tends to be highly unstable.").
275. The doctrine of stare decisis ameliorates these weaknesses of the common-law process.
As noted by Justice Stevens in his Central Bank of Denver dissent, the "'settled construction of
an important federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides."'
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 196 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990)).
276. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (explaining that regulation of securities
practices is " 'an area that demands certainty and predictability'" (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486
No. 1]
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Sanctions for fraud serve a purpose only when they influence the be-
havior of market participants.277 If potential liability is unpredictable,
then there is no incentive to modify behavior.278  As federal common
law developed by the judiciary, securities fraud jurisprudence lacks
the predictability and precision of federal law embodied in a
statute.279
Beyond the uncertainty inherent in federal common law, the defi-
nition of the implied private cause of action via an evolving process of
statutory construction is a poor method to "ensure that the rules es-
tablished to govern the 10b-5 action are symmetrical and consistent
with the overall structure of the Act."2 0 In general, systemic consis-
tency within a body of law helps to ensure that legal rules are predict-
able, evenhanded, and defensibly rational."s Construing the Section
10(b) cause of action as part of an integrated scheme of federal securi-
ties regulation is important for several reasons. Such a construction
helps to ensure that the implied action does not conflict with the ex-
press rights of action created by Congress, and it promotes "clarity,
consistency and coherence for those who rely upon or are subject to
10b-5 liability."'  Too often, the shifting course of securities fraud
jurisprudence has neglected this value. Individual judges and courts
have construed Section 10(b) by embracing policy rationales or inter-
pretive models that, although not without merit in isolation, nonethe-
U.S. 622, 652 (1988))); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983); United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d
612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
277. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188-90; S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)
("[E]ffective regulation must include several clear statutory provisions reinforced by penal and
civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demon-
strated to fulfill no useful function.").
278. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17.
279. See M. Stuart Madden, The Vital Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U.
ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 555, 567-72 (1996) (discussing shortcomings of common-law process).
One foundational value that the common law should strive for is replicability. Lawyers who
advise private actors in areas subject to common-law rules must be able to replicate the process
of judicial reasoning in order to describe the current state of the law. "[I]f courts [do] not use a
replicable process of reasoning the profession [cannot] give reliable legal advice in planning and
dispute-settlement, and planning and dispute-settlement on the basis of law would be frus-
trated." EISENBERG, supra note 215, at 11.
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that federal antifraud rules
are a necessary complement to state law because the legal error engendered by the "calculated
ambiguity" of the common law creates risk and litigation costs that are borne by participants in
securities transactions. EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 223, at 302. Of course, the in-
creased efficiency of federal law depends on that law being more predictable and less ambiguous
than the common law it would supplant.
280. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993); see
also id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The rule adopted today thus undermines not only the
discernable intent of Congress and the SEC, but also our own elaboration of this regulatory
scheme. Such are the risks that inhere in the 'hazardous enterprise' of recognizing a private right
of action despite congressional silence.").
281. See EISENBERG, supra note 215, at 44.
282. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 508 U.S. at 295.
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less bear no relation to the overall structure of the Securities
Exchange Act.283
The vagaries of the federal common law of securities fraud also
undermine the authority of the judiciary. It is inevitable that law de-
rived from the interpretation of statutes will evolve and incorporate
the assumptions of the judges who make such law. Untethered from
guiding principles set forth by the legislature, however, this evolution
may be unduly influenced by subjective factors. Professor Grundfest
has noted that
[t]he lack of a "discernible pattern" in the resolution of securities
fraud suits is harmful not just because of an "anti-plaintiff" or
"anti-defendant" tilt that may be reflected in the outcome of indi-
vidual cases, but because of the cynicism toward the law that in-
evitably results from a regime in which the identity of the judge
or the venue of the proceedi can be more important than the
facts underlying the dispute. "- ,
Although the same cynicism may result from the judicial interpreta-
tion of a more explicit statute, the potential is markedly increased
when the judge, alone, is perceived to define the parameters of the
parties' legal rights.285
In other respects, the vagaries of the federal common law of se-
curities fraud reveal how the content of the private cause of action is
vulnerable to changing trends in judicial philosophy.286 It is not sur-
prising that, over time, differing views concerning the appropriate role
of judges as lawmakers come to predominate among the judiciary.
For example, an interpretative method such as textualism-divorced
as it is from legislative history and public policy-has a surface appeal
for judges who place a high value on the separation of powers be-
tween the legislative and the judicial branches and who favor judicial
restraint. However, it is unclear why the current popularity of textual-
ism among some segments of the judiciary should determine when
specific conduct should or should not be deemed fraudulent.
The irony of the turn toward textualism in the securities law con-
text is that, in application, it can ignore the will of Congress and there-
fore undermine the very separation of powers that textualism is
283. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
284. Grundfest, supra note 14, at 739.
285. See EISENBERG, supra note 215, at 10 (stating that, when courts abandon existing com-
mon-law standards in favor of a substantially different standard, this event threatens the legiti-
macy of legal rules crafted by "an institution that is not conceived as representative, has a
narrow base of experience, and is deliberately structured in a fashion that limits its accountabil-
ity and responsiveness to the citizenry as a whole").
286. For examples of how judicial decision making may be viewed as the product of a "judi-
cial philosophy" comprised of basic assumptions and methods of reasoning, see Fallone, supra
note 34, at 860-61; Edward A. Fallone, Neither Liberal nor Laissez Faire: A Prediction of Justice
Ginsburg's Approach to Business Law Issues, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 279; see also Plass,
supra note 235, at 129-31.
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intended to respect. An example of such a result occurred in the af-
termath of the Central Bank of Denver opinion. When the Supreme
Court eliminated aiding and abetting liability in private litigation in
Central Bank of Denver on the basis of the statutory language, its rea-
soning also eliminated aiding and abetting liability in civil and crimi-
nal actions brought by the SEC against aiders and abettors. It is
doubtful whether the Congress of 1934 intended such a limitation on
the Commission's enforcement authority. The Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 overturned the Central Bank of Denver
opinion insofar as it applied to actions brought by the SEC.2" Prior
to the advent of the textualist approach, the scope of the implied pri-
vate cause of action could be judicially developed and refined without
fear of infringing upon the statute's express grant of enforcement au-
thority to the Commission.
By leading to the embrace of textualism, the vagaries of the fed-
eral common law of securities fraud have also created an internal in-
consistency within the private cause of action. Because the Central
Bank of Denver majority disavowed any intention to overrule prior
precedent,2s the textualist approach to interpreting Section 10(b) will
be utilized only in the resolution of certain issues as yet unsettled in
relation to the scope of liability, such as whether secondary liability
may be imposed using common-law doctrines of respondeat superior.
Textualism does not "undo" the settled expansive interpretation of
certain elements of the cause of action, such as reliance. 89
It serves no purpose to have some aspects of private liability con-
strained by the language of the text when the elements of the cause of
action have developed free from such constraints, particularly when
the distinction between questions relating to the scope of liability and
questions relating to an element of the plaintiff's claim is a fine one. 90
The elements of the plaintiff's cause of action should be defined in
relation to, and interdependently of, one another. Of particular con-
cern, however, would be the adoption of a textualist interpretation of
the scope of liability that subverts the scope of elements that have
heretofore been defined in policy terms.
For example, the implications of Central Bank of Denver for re-
spondeat superior liability are obvious: the analysis contained in the
majority opinion would preclude secondary liability premised on re-
spondeat superior principles for the simple reason that the statutory
287. See Securities Exchange Act § 20(f); see also Roman, supra note 34, at manuscript page
78.
288. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
289. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
290. Cf. Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is a risk
of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied causes of action ... to a
statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of this kind broadly to accord with their
remedial purposes .... ").
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text contains no mention of such liability. One might observe that the
only liability contemplated for non-knowing participants in fraudulent
conduct, such as employers, is under the provisions of Section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act relating to "control persons. ' 291 Con-
gress's express inclusion of this section in the Securities Exchange Act
adds weight to the argument that the exclusion of general respondeat
superior liability within the language of Section 10(b) was intentional.
However, such a textual analysis may have implications for the as
yet unsettled interpretation of the scienter element. The Central Bank
of Denver majority holds out the prospect that an element of the
plaintiff's claim, such as the scienter requirement, may still be defined
with reference to overall policy considerations. When considering
whether recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter element, how-
ever, a lower court would have to give some weight to a Supreme
Court decision holding that a wide variety of non-knowing conduct by
employers and the like is not actionable. The existence of such a hold-
ing immediately puts the plaintiff on the defensive: instead of arguing
why public policy supports the imposition of liability for reckless con-
duct, the plaintiff must argue why public policy requires treating pri-
mary actors differently than secondary actors. Although this may not
be an insurmountable hurdle, it is conceivable that the textualist ap-
proach as applied to a question dealing with the scope of liability,
however defined, may end up constricting or otherwise subverting the
ability of later litigants to argue for expansive interpretations of the
elements of the cause of action.292
Finally, the vagaries of the federal common law have led us to a
dead end. Textualism may ultimately prove incapable of practical ap-
plication in the context of Section 10(b). The language of that Section
and of Rule 10b-5 is too vague to provide much guidance in isolation
from policy considerations. Requiring support in the text itself before
liability can be imposed on the basis of challenged conduct is problem-
atic given the fact that the statutory language is a hollow shell. The
text is so vague that it has been characterized as a Rorschach test: the
reader can give meaning to the language of the text only by bringing
to bear his or her own understanding of the policy goals served by the
securities laws.293 In the end, textualism is a formalistic device that
masks the continued persistence of policy-based rationales as the
291. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994).
292. See also Roman, supra note 34, at manuscript page 55. But cf. Manns v. Skolnick, 666
N.E.2d 1236, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (requiring no showing of intent to defraud under plain
language of antifraud provision of Indiana securities law).
293. See Grundfest, supra note 222, at 43; see also D'Amato, supra note 138, at 935 ("Hasn't
justice become impossible to get from courts if judges insist on upsetting both sides' expectations
of what law was when their case or controversy arose, and instead pull the rug out from under
their feet with new law based on the judges' own idea of general social and governmental policy?
... Isn't this the very definition of injustice?").
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source of content for the cause of action.29  The Justices will continue
to adopt and reject different motivational grounds for their interpreta-
tions of Section 10(b), but the true reasons for these twists and turns
will be hidden behind a screen of textualism.
V. CODIFICATION UNDER A STRUCTURALIST APPROACH
A. The Merits of a Structuralist Interpretation
1. Structuralism Versus Textualism
A basic flaw in the interpretation of Section 10(b) under existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence is that the boundaries of the private
cause of action have been defined with insufficient attention to the
overall statutory scheme of the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act. The importation of common-law principles in
order to give Section 10(b) substance, as modified on the basis of pol-
icy rationales, does not speak to the overall structure of federal regu-
lation.29 5 Recognition of this deficiency in the common-law approach
appears to have inspired the majority to shift gears in Central Bank of
Denver.29 6 However, the Court's embrace of a textualist approach
shares the same deficiency as the prior common-law approach. Both
methods of interpreting Section 10(b) subordinate the underlying con-
gressional principles revealed in the structure of the securities laws to
other interpretive guides, whether they be public policy or isolated
textual provisions.
Theories of statutory interpretation are typically divided into
three inquiries concerning: (1) the intent of the legislature ("inten-
tionalism"); (2) the purpose of the statute ("modified intentional-
ism"); or (3) the plain meaning of the text itself ("textualism").297 It is
fruitless to argue for a return to the original intent of the 1934 Con-
gress in defining the scope of a 10b-5 action, because that body never
intended to create a private right of action in the first place.298 In
regards to the other two alternatives, the Supreme Court has struggled
with the selection of an appropriate interpretive method in the con-
text of Section 10(b).
294. See Farber, supra note 216, at 1549. A lack of candor in failing to disclose the true
reasoning employed in their written opinions raises the prospect that judges-who are discharg-
ing a public function-will not be held accountable for their actions. See Idleman, supra note
139, at 1335-45.
295. See, e.g., William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carmen, Respondeat Superior and the Fed-
eral Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1983).
296. See 511 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1994) (refusing to imply aiding and abetting liability under
§ 10(b) due, in part, to the lack of aiding and abetting liability under the express causes of action
contained within the securities laws).
297. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 14, 25, 34 (ascrib-
ing the name "purposivism" to modified intentionalism).
298. See Thel, supra note 144, at 385.
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The courts originally attempted to apply a form of modified in-
tentionalism to Section 10(b). As discussed above, the broad purpose
of Section 10(b) minimizes the utility of this approach and necessitates
the use of policy rationales as an interpretive aid in order to give con-
tent to the private cause of action. At times, principles of public pol-
icy have informed the interpretation of Section 10(b) without any
reference to the principles underlying the carefully designed structure
of the securities laws.
This point was made tellingly by the dissent in Dirks v. SEC.299
The Dirks case dealt with the standard under which a tippee could be
prosecuted for insider trading. Justice Blackmun's dissent points out
that the majority, by holding that a tippee could violate Section 10(b)
only in circumstances where the tipper received a pecuniary gain for
his actions, adopted a limitation on the scope of Section 10(b) that
ignored the question of whether the challenged conduct caused an in-
jury that the Securities Exchange Act was intended to prevent.300
There may have been compelling policy reasons for requiring a pecu-
niary gain on the part of the tipper in order to impose liability, but
those reasons lack any obvious connection to the reasons Congress
sought to regulate market conduct via the Securities Exchange Act.301
The elements of a common-law fraud action were developed to
reflect interpersonal transactions where one party was directly
deceived by the word or actions of her counterpart. A face-to-face
sale of property, where trust is sought and betrayed by one of the
participants, is the archetype of conduct actionable under common-
law fraud. This archetype is a crude fit when transposed to the world
of stock exchanges, brokered transactions, and stock held in "street
name" only. Rule 10b-5 is often applied to impersonal transactions
where the supposedly deceitful or misleading words or actions are
never communicated directly to the complaining party. The deceived
party's trust is reposed in "the system," and her faith in the system is
premised on the belief that it is not a rigged game.3°  The structure
299. 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
300. See id. at 673-74.
301. See id. at 677-78.
302. The difficulty that arises in transposing common-law fraud principles to the operation
of our securities markets is perhaps most striking in cases involving insider trading. Silence
constitutes deception only when there is a duty to speak. The failure of insiders to disclose
information in their possession prior to engaging in a securities transaction is fraud under the
common law only if the insiders owe a duty to the other party to the transaction. However,
strictly speaking, corporate insiders owe a duty to the corporation and not to individual share-
holders. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 870.
Insider trading can occur when insiders purchase stock from existing corporate shareholders
while in possession of advance information concerning positive corporate developments. See,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Under the common law, the
general rule is that insiders owe no broad-based duty to share information with existing share-
holders in the corporation when the insiders act in a personal (noncorporate) capacity and the
transaction occurs on an open market. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630
(D. Del. 1943), affd, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass.
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that Congress chose to utilize in creating a system of securities regula-
tion tells us more about the appropriate boundaries of the private
cause of action on the basis of conduct occurring in this specialized
environment than do the policy arguments that have been used to cus-
tomize the traditional elements of common-law fraud.
Dissatisfied with the course of the federal common law using an
approach of modified intentionalism, the Supreme Court has lately
shifted toward textualism as a means of interpreting Section 10(b).3 °3
At this point, the Supreme Court undoubtedly views textualism as the
most satisfactory of the three alternative interpretive inquiries out-
lined above. In theory, textualism combines the guidance of the plain
meaning of the text with a certain amount of flexibility in interpreting
that meaning. When interpreting a statutory provision that is part of a
larger statute, most strict textualists consider it proper to make refer-
ence to the remainder of the statute in their reading of the specific
provision at issue. 3° In this manner, textualism employs a degree of
"structural analysis" that informs the specific statutory language.30 5
However, as applied in the securities law context, the current
Supreme Court has placed inordinate weight on the meaning of par-
ticular statutory language at the expense of larger structural princi-
1933). Some jurisdictions follow a "special facts exception." See Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 661.
Such an exception makes sense in cases involving face-to-face dealing between the insider and
the shareholder or the repose of some special trust due to a preexisting relationship. However,
in either event the "special facts" would only exist where the stock transaction was executed in
person and not anonymously over an impersonal exchange. A minority of states follow a strict
fiduciary rule. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 160-61 n.40 (citing state-law cases).
Insider trading also can occur when insiders sell corporate stock on advance knowledge of
negative corporate developments. Even if insiders owe a common-law duty to existing share-
holders when they purchase shares on the basis of nonpublic information, the common law
would impose no duty on insiders when they sell shares to persons who are not already share-
holders. In the former context, the insiders stand in a preexisting relation to the shareholders,
and the question of whether their conduct constitutes deception turns on the scope of that rela-
tionship. However, to construe "fraud" to include a duty to disclose even to persons with whom
the insiders have no preexisting relationship is a significant relaxation of common-law principles.
The SEC has historically argued in favor of reading Section 10(b) to relax common-law princi-
ples in this manner in the context of insider trading. See In re Cady, Roberts Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961). In Cady the SEC stated, "We cannot accept ... that an insider's responsibility is limited
to existing stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made to
non-stockholders. This approach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public-
wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information." Id at 913. Compare id. with
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,222-23 (1980) (noting that insider trading liability under
Rule 10b-5 "is premised upon a duty to disclose . . . arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction .... [No duty could arise] from petitioner's relation-
ship with the sellers of the target companies' securities, for [petitioner] had no prior dealings
with them.").
303. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
304. See Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 22; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,
625-26 (8th Cir. 1996) ("fraudulent" conduct prohibited by § 14(e) should be interpreted to be
coextensive with the "deceptive" conduct prohibited by § 10(b)), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759
(1997).
305. See Eisenberg, supra note 207, at 22; see also EsKRIMGE, supra note 138, at 41-42
(ascribing such a view to Justice Scalia and characterizing this approach as "holistic textualism").
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ples. 30 6  For example, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. ,307 the minority
opinion advocated a textualist interpretation that would have given
effect to the plain meaning of the word "prospectus" as utilized in
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, without regard to the overall
structure of that statute and its relation to the Securities Exchange
Act.30 8 The result would have been the application of a carefully
crafted standard of liability well outside of the boundaries of industry
practice for which it was designed.
Surprisingly, the majority in Gustafson, which rightly concluded
that Section 12(2) did not apply to Secondary transactions and was
limited in application to the context of a primary offering of securities,
was unwilling to base its holding solely upon the logical interrelation
between Section 12 and the specific underwriting practices that the
Securities Act was carefully constructed to regulate. Instead, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion begins with a befuddled discussion of Sec-
tion 10 of the 1933 Act, which also uses the term "prospectus," in
order to read its usage of the term into Section 12.309 This tactic can
be viewed as an attempt to preempt the argument that the Court's
holding must be governed by the definition of "prospectus" contained
in Section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, an extraordinarily broad definition
that is not limited by its terms to primary offerings. However, by en-
gaging in such semantic games, Justice Kennedy allows the textualists
to choose the field of battle. In both the majority and the dissent, the
Court's reasoning is handcuffed by the Justices' unquestioned accept-
ance of the premise that the meaning of Section 12(2) must be divined
in the first instance from the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage.310 The unmistakable impression given by the manner in which
both the majority and the minority employ a textualist approach is
that they are focusing on individual saplings while ignoring the
forest.311
306. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invita-
tion to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 762-63
(1995) (suggesting that recent Supreme Court cases in a variety of subject areas instruct the
lower federal courts to apply the plain meaning of a statutory provision, even where such a
reading results in a conflict with the remainder of the statute).
307. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
308. See id. at 1067-69; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustaf-
son Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231 (1995); Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95, 117-18 (1996); Elliott
J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?,
50 Bus. LAW. 1209 (1995).
309. See 115 S. Ct. at 1066-67; see also Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group, No. 93 Civ.
7581, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9548, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1995) (dismissing claim under § 12(2)
because offering document did not need to comply with requirements of § 10 and therefore was
not a "prospectus").
310. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
311. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 32 ("The Supreme Court often follows the plain
meaning of the statutory text over objections that the literalist interpretation undermines the
original intent or purpose of the Congress that enacted the statute.").
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Structuralism, a fourth alternative theory of interpreting texts,
provides a superior basis for giving content to Section 10(b) than
either modified intentionalism or textualism.312 The structuralist ap-
proach has sometimes been advocated as a means of constitutional
interpretation.313 Structuralism differs from textualism in that it seeks
to derive authority from a text while recognizing that the text being
interpreted does not explicitly address the subject matter of the in-
quiry.314 Unlike a textualist reading of the statute, there is little
chance that the operating principles revealed through a close analysis
of the statute's overall structure will get tripped up by the definition of
individual words contained in the text.315 In the case of Section 10(b),
which has been characterized as having "no intrinsic meaning, '316 it is
particularly appropriate to subordinate the specific statutory text to
the overall role that private causes of action play within the entire
system of securities regulation. 317
An example of a structuralist interpretation of Section 10(b) can
be seen in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.318
Lampf sought to define the statute of limitations in a 10b-5 action.
Obviously, the Securities Exchange Act does not set forth a statute of
limitations applicable to implied causes of action under its terms. The
text of Section 10(b) itself is silent on the issue as well.319 In Lampf,
312. See generally George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 347-55
(1995) (discussing the merits of structuralism).
313. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
7 (1969) (suggesting that the "explication or exegesis of [a] particular... passage" of the Consti-
tution should not guide our interpretation of that document, but rather that its meaning should
be found in "inference[s] from the structures and relationships created by the Constitution");
PMLIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 74-92 (1982). But see ESKRIDOE, supra note 138, at 7
(arguing that theories of statutory construction are "distinct from, and intellectually independent
of," theories of constitutional construction).
314. "Structural arguments are inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and
the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures." BoBBrrr, supra note
313, at 74. For example, it has been argued that a structuralist approach towards constitutional
interpretation is perhaps the most satisfactory means of locating a constitutional source for the
federal power to control immigration, a power nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitu-
tion. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 16
(3d ed. 1995) ("Under this view, one does not focus on isolated clauses in the document; instead,
the interpreter takes a step back and examines the shape of the Constitution as a whole: the
institutions it creates and the relationships between those institutions.").
315. Cf EsRIDGE, supra note 138, at 42-44 (criticizing Justice Scalia's opinion in Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), for placing great weight on the plain meaning of
the specific text without adequate regard to structural arguments).
316. See Grundfest, supra note 222, at 41.
317. It may be accurate to describe the normal process of statutory construction as an "in-
teraction between interpreter and text that creates new and perhaps unexpected meaning over
time." See ESKRIDGE, supra note 138, at 62. However, where the text itself is devoid of content,
this "interaction" is more akin to the sound of one hand clapping. The choice of a structuralist
approach resolves this interpretive dilemma. But see Stem, supra note 128, at 3 (arguing that the
"constitutionalization" of the interpretive methods used to construe § 10(b) results in an inap-
propriately narrow reading of the cause of action).
318. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
319. See id. at 358.
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the Supreme Court constructed a statute of limitations for the cause of
action under Section 10(b) solely on the basis of the operating princi-
ples that it divined from the express causes of action contained in the
securities laws. As a result of this inquiry, the Court concluded that
the appropriate statute of limitations was one year after discovery of
the fraud, with a three-year period of repose.32 °
The Supreme Court engaged in a similar structuralist interpreta-
tion of Section 10(b) in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau,32 1 when it held that a right of contribution exists in an im-
plied private action under Section 10(b).322 In that case, the Court
looked to the express causes of action and stated that "consistency
requires us to adopt a like contribution rule ... under Rule 10b-5. ' 323
However, in Central Bank of Denver, the majority opinion discussed
the approach utilized in both Lampf and Musick only after it had con-
cluded that the text of Section 10(b) itself resolved the question.324
The Central Bank of Denver Court missed an opportunity to clearly
embrace structuralism as a rule of decision and unwisely decided to
pursue a textualist approach that relies heavily upon the specific lan-
guage contained in Section 10(b).
The statutory language contained in any one provision of the se-
curities laws is susceptible to interpretations that subvert the carefully
designed structure of the securities laws, as demonstrated by the dis-
sent's reasoning in Gustafson.325 Instead, any attempt to interpret
Section 10(b) should give primacy to the overall structure of both the
1933 Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A struc-
turalist interpretation of Section 10(b), rather than the more narrow
textualist approach, provides the best available method to restrict the
wide-ranging discretion that the judiciary otherwise possesses in the
interpretation of an implied private cause of action.326
2. Principles Derived from a Structuralist Interpretation
It is possible to derive certain basic principles relating to the con-
duct that should be subject to private liability under Section 10(b)
from the role that the explicit causes of action contained elsewhere in
the securities laws play within the overall structure of federal regula-
tion. A "structuralist" interpretation of the securities laws would de-
fine the cause of action under Section 10(b) by giving primacy to these
320. See id. at 359-61.
321. 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
322. See id. at 297.
323. Id.
324. 511 U.S. 164, 176-80 (1994).
325. See 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1078-79 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
326. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1081-87 (discussing the use of express private rights as
models for the implied right under § 10(b)); see also Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 204 (sug-
gesting that attention to the structure of the express causes of action contained in the securities
laws provides an analogy that may illuminate congressional intent regarding § 10(b)).
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principles over other possible sources of meaning.327 It is suggested
that a structuralist interpretation of Section 10(b) should provide the
framework for congressional efforts at codification.32
This approach might be criticized as yet another misguided search
for original intent. One could argue that codification efforts should be
directed toward transcribing the unobjectionable components of the
cause of action as developed via federal common law. However, there
are two reasons why it is preferable for the present day Congress to
seek guidance from the intent of the 1933 and 1934 Congresses, as
revealed in the structure of the Acts, rather than from modern judicial
interpretations of Section 10(b). First, to the extent that securities
fraud jurisprudence contains internal inconsistencies or allows Section
10(b) to operate in a manner alien to the remainder of the federal
securities laws, a transcription using current jurisprudence as a start-
ing point risks perpetuating these defects. Second, Congress in the
1930s was in the thick of an unprecedented economic crisis and was
intimately aware of the industry practices and speculative excesses
that had led to such a debacle. Congress's solution, a sweeping regu-
lation of the securities industry, was carefully designed to work as an
integrated statutory whole329 while, at the same time, avoiding any
needless expansion of federal law. The decisions made at that time
concerning the appropriate role that private litigation should play in
the enforcement of the securities laws need not be slavishly observed
today, but such decisions provide a useful point of departure for con-
temporary efforts to codify Section 10(b).33°
327. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1083-84; see also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74
(9th Cir. 1961) (rejecting structural interpretation of § 10(b) in order to avoid "judicial rewriting
of the 1934 Act to include procedural provisions which appear only in the 1933 Act").
328. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1084 ("A judicial attempt to apply Rule lOb-5 along
the lines of the express models.., would seem to be completely reasonable and, from a stand-
point of consistency, quite desirable.").
329. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360-61
(1991). The Lampf Court characterized the express causes of action contained in the 1934 Act
as follows:
Each is an integral element of a complex web of regulations. Each was intended to facilitate
a central goal: "to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities
exchanges."
Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
330. See Thel, supra note 144, at 409-10 (noting that the "analytical model of the stock
market that prevailed during the depression was very different from the current model"); cf.
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 361-62 (choosing statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions derived from original
express causes of action, rather than 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act). The Lampf Court stated, "We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would
have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance
struck by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections." Id. at 359. There is no
reason why our present Congress should not look to the balance struck by its predecessor when
seeking to codify a private cause of action under Section 10(b) that would best mesh with the
remainder of the securities laws. The axiom "patriots are not made in times of peace" appears
[Vol. 1997
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As originally drafted, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 con-
tains several express private rights of action for the violation of its
provisions.331 Section 9 prohibits manipulation of securities registered
on a national exchange.332 Section 16 prohibits "short swing"
trades.333 Section 18 prohibits false or misleading statements in any
application or report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion under the Exchange Act.334 Finally, Section 20 imposes liability
on "controlling persons" for violations of the Exchange Act commit-
ted by persons under their control.335 As has been noted elsewhere,
"[tihese remedies were carefully constructed and balanced; they ex-
tended relief beyond common-law protections, but the tradeoff was
the imposition of tight procedural restrictions and a short statute of
limitations. 336
A comparison with the circumstances and conduct that Congress
saw as justifying an express cause of action under the 1933 Securities
Act is also instructive.337 Like the express causes of action in the 1934
Act, these actions were created to give rise to liability beyond the
common law, specifically in the context of a public offering.338 Section
11 prohibits false statements and omissions in a registration state-
ment.339 Section 12 prohibits sales of unregistered securities as well as
false statements or omissions made either orally or in a prospectus.340
Finally, Section 15 imposes liability on "controlling persons" for viola-
tions of the Securities Act committed by persons under their con-
trol." 1 The placement of a public offering through the use of an
underwriting syndicate was a historical development that evolved in
the absence of federal regulation, and the 1933 Securities Act was
drafted to reflect and accommodate preexisting industry practice.
apt under these circumstances. A corollary might be "successful legislative solutions cannot be
crafted in the absence of lawful evils."
331. See generally Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 295-
96 (1993); Grundfest, supra note 7, at 964 n.2. In 1988, Congress added Section 20A to the
Exchange Act, which imposes liability for insider trading for the benefit of contemporaneous
purchasers or sellers of the security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-I (1994); Barbara Aldave, The Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALA. L.
REv. 893 (1989).
332. 15 U.S.C. § 78i.
333. Id. § 7 8 p.
334. Id. § 78r.
335. Id. § 78t.
336. SOLOMON ET AL, supra note 30, at 839.
337. See generally Musick, Peeler, & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286
(1993); Grundfest, supra note 7, at 964 n.2.
338. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1995).
339. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
340. Id. § 771. However, in Gustafson,'115 S. Ct. at 1067, the Court limited private action
under Section 12 to the context of a primary offering.
341. 15 U.S.C. § 77o.
No. 11
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The express causes of action under the 1933 Securities Act were
designed to impose strict liability' 2 on certain specified classes of de-
fendants in two situations. Strict liability is imposed for misrepresen-
tations or omissions made in documents whose production is required
by the Act. In addition, strict liability is imposed for failing to comply
with the procedures for disseminating information about the underly-
ing securities being placed via the public offering, as laid out in Sec-
tion 5 of the Act.
In the case of a public offering, this heightened standard of con-
duct, imposing duties beyond the common law, can be justified on two
grounds. First, under Section 12, this heightened liability reaches only
"sellers" in privity with the purchaser in a public offering. 43 This lim-
ited class of potential defendants can reasonably be expected to have
access to the issuer-related information of interest to purchasers, as
well as some control over its production. Persons who are mere col-
lateral participants in the sale of the public offering, and who thus lack
this same access to information about the issuer and the power to con-
trol its production, are unlikely to become defendants in an action
brought under these provisions.' Second, under all of the express
causes of action contained in the 1933 Securities Act, the application
of a heightened standard of conduct is explicitly tied to the production
or the dissemination of specified information in connection with a
public offering.345 Persons who do not engage in this well-defined
type of activity need not fear liability under these heightened
standards. 6
The express causes of action contained in the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act can be understood in a similar manner. They also create
heightened standards of conduct beyond that which is required by the
common law in circumstances where the defendant falls within a spec-
ified class of market participants or where the defendant engages in
well-defined conduct associated with market professionals. 7 Persons
who are not within the specified class, or who are not engaged in ac-
tivity common to market professionals, should be held to traditional
342. However, there is an affirmative defense if the defendant can show lack of loss causa-
tion. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
343. The word "sellers" encompasses the person who transfers title to the security offered,
as well as brokers and others who solicit offers to purchase the security in exchange for financial
remuneration. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
344. However, persons who derive a personal benefit from assisting the placement of a pub-
lic offering may become liable under Section 12 as a "statutory seller" even when they are not in
privity with the purchaser of the securities. See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647 n.23 (interpreting
§ 12(1)); Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989) (inter-
preting § 12(2)).
345. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1054-55, 1059-60 (summarizing §§ 11 and 12 as being
directed towards deterrence and not compensation).
346. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1995).
347. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1062-63 (suggesting that the strict reliance and causa-
tion elements of the § 18 private cause of action are intended to keep potential liability within
acceptable bounds in the absence of a privity requirement).
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standards of conduct. Therefore, before liability is imposed on indi-
viduals falling into the latter category, a plaintiff should satisfy all of
the requirements of the common law.
This analysis suggests that the Securities Exchange Act was in-
tended to create a standard of liability for private actions under fed-
eral law that differs at times from the standard of liability under state
common law, but which does not displace it. For example, private
actions under Section 10(b) should extend relief beyond the protec-
tions of common-law fraud, but not in the context of privately negoti-
ated transactions involving face-to-face dealings between the buyer
and seller. 348 Past judicial constructions of Section 10(b) that relax the
common-law standards of liability without reference to the public or
private cast of the conduct at issue are misguided. However, it is simi-
larly misguided to read the antifraud provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act in a purely textualist fashion in order to conclude that the
language therein prohibiting "fraudulent" and "deceptive" acts must,
of necessity, limit recovery for nondisclosures to instances where a fi-
duciary duty has been violated.349 The structure of the Securities Ex-
change Act indicates that, in certain circumstances, the 1934 Congress
sought to apply a more stringent standard of conduct to market actors
than the state law of fiduciary duties would otherwise impose.
3. Structuralism Applied: The Case of Reliance
The relaxation of the reliance element in a 10b-5 action is but one
example of how the vagaries of the federal common law have contrib-
uted to liability being imposed in the implied private action upon
classes of defendants and types of conduct that fall outside of the
boundaries of liability established by the structure of the express
causes of action.35 0 Blaming the plaintiffs' bar for all that is wrong
with securities fraud litigation, or trying to reform private litigation via
the new procedural hurdles contained in the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, is beside the point. As Professor Grundfest ob-
served in relation to the "fraud on the market" theory:
Some securities are intrinsically volatile because of the issuer's
business characteristics. If the legal system cannot accurately dis-
tinguish certain types of honest volatility from volatility caused by
fraud, then plaintiffs' counsel have a rational and legal incentive
to sue issuers who are innocent of fraud but who will have a hard
348. See also Letsou, supra note 308, at 124-32.
349. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,618 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 579 (1997).
350. See LASH, supra note 6, at 12; cf Carney v. Mantuano, 554 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1996) (requiring a showing of reliance under Wisconsin blue sky law). Another possible
example is the manner in which courts have interpreted the "causation" element of the cause of
action. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1049-50; cf Lucas v. Downtown Greenville Investors,
671 N.E.2d 389, 400 (INI. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that no showing of loss causation required
under Illinois blue sky law).
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time proving that fact.... Viewed from this perspective... it is
the system that is wrong.35 1
A structural interpretation of the Securities Act and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act leads to the conclusion that Congress, in the after-
math of the stock market crash of 1929, sought to impose federal
regulation over the operation of the securities markets within clearly
defined boundaries. Section 10(b) "protects investors," but it does so
by prohibiting deceptive practices that are inextricably related to the
practices of participants in the securities industry. Because the 1933
and 1934 Acts are explicit in denying any intention to preempt ex-
isting state law, 35 2 fraudulent conduct in a face-to-face transaction be-
tween individuals who are both unconnected to the securities industry
and not engaged in a regular process of capital raising should at least
be subject to the rigorous standards of a state law action for deceit.353
Congress deliberately included a reliance requirement when it
drafted Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, which provides a
private cause of action for misleading statements contained in a filing
required by the SEC.354 The relaxation of the reliance element in the
analogous 10b-5 action is an unmerited departure from the overall
structure of the securities laws. Admittedly, certain express causes of
action in the 1933 Securities Act either contain no reliance require-
ment or employ justifiable reliance as an affirmative defense, rather
than as an element of the plaintiff's claim.355 However, these are all
express causes of action reaching a limited class of possible defend-
ants-either a defined group of market professionals or company in-
siders, on the one hand, or persons in privity with the plaintiff.356 The
decision to place the burden of proof on the defendant in these ac-
tions must be understood in light of the specific position that the de-
fendant has in the securities marketplace. Section 10(b) reaches a far
broader class of defendants than those who can be categorized as cor-
porate insiders or market professionals, and it reaches fraudulent ac-
tors even where they do not deal directly with the plaintiffs.
Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret the 10b-5 cause of action to
351. Grundfest, supra note 14, at 735.
352. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994) and Securities Exchange Act
§ 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
353. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that transaction did not in-
volve the sale of a security because of the private nature of the transaction); see also Letsou,
supra note 308, at 124-32.
354. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 257-58 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting).
355. Section 11 has no reliance requirement unless the plaintiff purchased the security more
than 12 months after the effective date of the registration statement. See HAZEN, supra note 71,
at 331. Section 12 does not require reliance as an affirmative part of the plaintiff's case, but a
defendant can avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff knew of the fraud at the time of
purchase and therefore could not have relied upon the misrepresentation. See id. at 355.
356. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a) & 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a) & 771.
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require a higher reliance requirement than the express causes of ac-
tion in the 1933 Act.357
The burden of proof to demonstrate reliance should not be re-
moved from the plaintiff's shoulders in a 10b-5 action. Before being
allowed to recover, each plaintiff in a private action under Rule 10b-5
should be required to show actual reliance on the misrepresentation
or omission.358 Plaintiffs also should be required to demonstrate that
they exercised due diligence, to the extent reasonable under their indi-
vidual circumstances, in order to verify the representations made to
them.359 The reliance element should incorporate a demonstration of
due diligence, whether or not the plaintiff has been placed on notice
of possible fraud by the presence of certain red flags. Sophisticated
plaintiffs, and those represented by sophisticated professionals in a se-
curities transaction, should rightly be expected to exercise a greater
degree of due diligence than unsophisticated plaintiffs in order to es-
tablish reliance.
Following the above analysis, the "fraud on the market" theory of
liability, which allows a plaintiff to rely upon the integrity of the mar-
ket price of the security without knowledge of the misrepresentation
or omission by the defendant, is a similar example of improper relaxa-
tion of the reliance element in 10b-5 actions. Such relaxation is con-
trary to the structure of the express causes of action. 36 ° The "fraud on
the market" theory allows severe fluctuations in the price of corporate
stock to be challenged by the assertion that the movement in price
was the result of either inaccurately disclosed information or a fraudu-
lent delay by corporate officers in disclosing information to the mar-
ket. "Fraud" is therefore defined without the existence of any direct
reliance upon the defendant's representations and in terms totally sep-
arate from the subjective state of mind of the allegedly deceived plain-
tiff.36 1 Supporters of the theory argue that the "deception" occurred
when the plaintiff placed faith in the stock price as an accurate indica-
tor of the stock's value, and that the theory is justified by the broad
357. See also Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996) (holding that privity require-
ment contained in antifraud provisions of Utah Securities Act obviates need to interpret statute
to require showing of reliance).
358. See Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996).
359. See Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1996) (sophisticated purchaser
cannot rely on statements by seller that were specifically disclaimed in purchase contract);
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he federal securi-
ties laws are intended to put investors into a position from which they can help themselves by
relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to make. This system is not furthered by al-
lowing monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for themselves."); see also McCormick
v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994); Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 1993).
360. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1086. But see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds,
Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to
Securities Fraud, 49 U. MiAMi L. REV. 671, 727-30 (1995).
361. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 256 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday,
the Court allows investors to recover who can show little more than that they sold stock at a
lower price than what might have been."); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 24, at 1032-33.
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remedial purposes that motivated Congress in passing Section
10(b).362
However, recent empirical research suggests that imposing Sec-
tion 10(b) liability on the basis of the "fraud on the market" theory is
fundamentally inconsistent with the normal price volatility exper-
ienced by the stock of emerging high-tech companies.363 Companies
in emerging industries like biotechnology or advanced telecommuni-
cations often encounter high development costs and technological
challenges that combine to create product delays and cost overruns.
Future earnings of such companies are often speculative, leading to
situations where the market substantially reevaluates the company's
future prospects on the basis of small pieces of information. The mar-
ket price of the company's stock may be informationally efficient but
may not allocate that information efficiently.
Moreover, the existence of the "fraud on the market" theory of
liability exposes companies in some industries to a systemic market
risk of litigation based on large price swings. These price swings, com-
mon for start-up companies in high-tech industries, are unforeseeable
in regards to any individual company within the industry and are
therefore unpreventable. 36 The risk of litigation thus becomes a cost
borne by all companies within that industry, regardless of the integrity
of their management or the adequacy of their internal controls. There
is a risk that capital raising within these industries could be impeded
as a result of this cost.365
One might question whether the law should presume the plain-
tiff's right to rely on the accuracy of the market price of a company's
stock, when such a theory seems to be at odds with the normal work-
ings of the securities market in certain emerging industries.3 6 More
importantly, economic theories concerning the operation of efficient
362. See James D. Cox, Just Deserts [sic] for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Den-
ver, 38 Aiuz. L. REV. 519, 543-44 (1996) (emphasizing deterrent effect of "fraud on the market"
theory); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1 (1982) (criticizing conventional approach to calculat-
ing securities fraud plaintiffs' damages and suggesting more economically realistic method);
Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1143 (1982) (questioning soundness of
"fraud on the market" theory and arguing that its use should be limited to developed markets).
363. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 5 (noting research suggesting that stock volatility often
precedes the filing of a securities class action complaint); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note
24, at 1012-13.
364. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 973 n.40 (noting that "[allmost one-third of all publicly
traded biotechnology companies have been sued in securities class actions").
365. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 24, at 1028.
366. As discussed above, some have attacked the empirical underpinnings of the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis, on which the "fraud on the market" theory, in turn, is premised.
See supra note 48. For an argument that the boom in successful initial public offerings belies any
detrimental effect of the securities laws on capital formation in emerging industries, see Selig-
man I, supra note 14, at 440. The relevance of successful IPOs to the litigation costs borne by
companies in emerging industries has been questioned, however. See Grundfest, supra note 14,
at 730.
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 136 1997
No. 1] VAGARIES OF THE COMMON LAW
markets underlie the "fraud on the market" theory. 367 None of the
express causes of action created by Congress in the securities laws re-
flects a congressional concern with the economic theory behind move-
ments in stock price.368 Instead, the express causes of action are
designed to work in conjunction with contemporaneously imposed re-
quirements to disclose specified information. Congress was not con-
cerned with crafting a federal law that would apply to all information,
regardless of whether the mandatory disclosure provisions were impli-
cated.369 Elevating economic theory to an exalted level in the defini-
tion of the private cause of action is inappropriate.
Despite the federal government's interest in a national securities
market, federalism concerns should counsel against the displacement
of state law standards of liability in the context of isolated securities
transactions between private individuals that do not implicate the
overall scheme of mandatory disclosure. 37 ° Federal law should dis-
place state-law standards of liability only where the conduct regulated
has a more "public" cast: instances involving public offerings or trans-
actions conducted by market professionals and other regular and well-
defined market actors, such as the officers and directors of publicly
traded companies.37' These are the situations where Congress in-
tended to create heightened standards of conduct.372
The present scope of Rule 10b-5 liability extends far beyond the
range of activity that Congress sought to reach via the express causes
of action in the 1933 and 1934 legislation. The dissonance between
the scope of Rule 10b-5 liability and the structure of the securities
laws is significant given the care that Congress gave to constructing
statutes that were closely tailored to the operation of the securities
367. See Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market. A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Re-
quirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984); Jonathan Macey &
Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market The-
ory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990).
368. But see Thel, supra note 144, at 392 (arguing that one plain meaning of § 10(b)'s lan-
guage may be to prohibit any act that threatens the integrity of security prices). Congress has a
greater understanding of economic theory underlying stock price movements today than it had
in 1934. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 742 (1995) ("Technology companies-because of
the volatility of their stock prices-are particularly vulnerable to securities fraud lawsuits when
projections do not materialize.").
369. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) ("Congress, in enacting the secur-
ities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.").
370. Cf. id. at 559 (contract akin to a "private transaction" held not to be a security); see
Gabaldon, supra note 123, at 162-69.
371. Cf Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1073 (1995). In interpreting Section 12 of
the 1933 Securities Act, the majority stated that "[i]n light of the care that Congress took to
justify the imposition of liability without proof of either fraud or reliance on 'those whose moral
responsibility to the public is particularly heavy,'-the 'originators of securities'-we can not
conclude that Congress would have extended that liability to every private or secondary sale
without a whisper of explanation." Id.
372. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933), quoted in Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1072.
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markets.373 Reform efforts in the realm of securities litigation should
focus on removing this dissonance, so that the implied private right of
action to recover for securities fraud will be more closely integrated
into the structure of the Acts as a whole.
B. The Merits of Codification
Elimination of the dissonance between current 10b-5 jurispru-
dence and the overall structure of the Acts, including the express
causes of action contained therein, cannot occur via the common-law
decision-making process. One unlikely alternative, despite the pres-
ent low regard exhibited toward Cort v. Ash 374 and implied private
rights of action under federal law, is the elimination of the cause of
action altogether by the judiciary. The Supreme Court appears to rec-
ognize that we have gone too far down this road to turn back now. 375
In addition, there is no denying the proven utility of some mea-
sure of private enforcement under Section 10(b) as an aid to the polic-
ing of the securities markets by the SEC.3 76  It is true that some
private actions target borderline conduct that the Commission would
decline to prosecute even if it had unlimited resources.377 However,
the existence of the private right of action allows the SEC to direct its
investigative and trial manpower toward selected areas of conduct,
such as insider trading, while relying on the plaintiffs' bar to police the
more "garden variety" fraudulent conduct. The complete elimination
of the private cause of action would be acceptable, from an enforce-
ment standpoint, only if accompanied by a massive increase in funding
and resources for the SEC.378 Even under those circumstances,
373. See also Grundfest, supra note 7, at 981 (stating that "[t]he overall structure of [the
federal securities laws] further supports the conclusion that the Commission is compelled neither
to draft not to interpret Rule lOb-5 in a manner that sustains implied private rights of action").
374. 442 U.S. 66 (1975); see supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
375. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988); Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (existence of the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5
is "beyond peradventure"); Grundfest, supra note 7, at 976 n.53 (listing Supreme Court prece-
dent explicitly or implicitly recognizing the private right of action). The Supreme Court has
viewed the enactment of federal legislation acknowledging the existence of implied rights under
the securities laws as an indication of congressional acceptance of those rights and of the Court's
role in their development. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S.
286, 292-93 (1993).
376. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 969 & n.15 (noting that the "social value of private
enforcement has become an article of faith in the federal securities liturgy").
377. See id. at 970.
378. See id. at 966 (suggesting the possibility of reallocating enforcement authority to give
the SEC responsibility for policing certain fraudulent conduct beyond the scope of the private
right of action).
In many ways, the system of mandatory disclosure instituted by the federal securities laws is
designed to redress a market failure: the absence of sufficient voluntary disclosure of informa-
tion by corporations and market professionals necessary to allow informed investment decisions
by purchasers and sellers of securities. Classical regulation through government agencies and
private enforcement via the federal courts are merely two alternative ways of addressing market
failures. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 156-83 (1982). If the manner
of government regulation selected is ill designed to rectify the perceived market failure, one
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doubts would remain as to whether purely public enforcement is as
efficient a deterrent as a combination of public and private
enforcement.
Furthermore, the judiciary is not an appropriate institution for
the wholesale rejection of current securities fraud jurisprudence and
its replacement with a newly crafted cause of action. The Supreme
Court's own opinions discussing implied private rights of action recog-
nize that the creation of a cause of action, ab initio, is essentially a
legislative function.379 Any judicial attempt to restate the cause of ac-
tion in its entirety would suffer from a judicial process that, in compar-
ison to the legislative process, lacks complete access to relevant
information and excludes the participation of the entire affected
population.
The piecemeal reform of the cause of action, through an ongoingjudicial reinterpretation of Section 10(b), also appears unsatisfactory.
For one, the vagaries of the federal common law coupled with the lack
of congressional guidance ensure that future interpretations of the ex-
isting implied cause of action will continue to be subjected to the shift-
ing tides of judicial philosophy. Judicial decisions seeking to reform
the current scope of Rule 10b-5 litigation must coexist uneasily with
contradictory prior precedent. The result is a cause of action divided
against itself, with elements defined using disparate policies, princi-
ples, and reasoning as a touchstone.38 ° Continued adherence to a tex-
tualist approach will serve only to mask these contradictions. A
further change in course to reject textualism would exacerbate them.
In addition, the inherent deficiencies of the common-law process
counsel against piecemeal judicial reform as an alternative. By its na-
ture, the judiciary must define the elements of a 10b-5 action through
individualized cases raising narrow issues and involving specific par-
ties. There is a sense of immediacy to the debate over the future of
private securities litigation that cannot be satisfied through such a
gradual process of reform.38' A selective overruling of prior prece-
dent would take time, would involve widely disparate fact patterns,
possible societal response is deregulation of the industry coupled with increased private enforce-
ment. See id.; Fallone, supra note 34, at 863-64 (noting Breyer's argument in support of such an
approach to antitrust enforcement). By the same token, it must be recognized that imposing
significant limitations on the utility of the private cause of action as a means of legal enforce-
ment will inevitably place a greater regulatory burden on the governmental entity charged with
policing the industry and remedying the market failure.
379. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 508 U.S. at 291 ("[T]he creation of new rights ought
to be left to legislatures, not courts.").
380. See supra text accompanying notes 216-35.
381. Recall that the decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995), deter-
mining the statute of limitations applicable to lob-5 claims brought prior to 1991, came four
years after the Supreme Court's Lampf decision, which was itself the culmination of years of
litigation on the issue. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, The Supreme Court's Plaut
Decision, LEXIS Counsel Connect, Apr. 21, 1995 (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
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and would be influenced by the divergent views of present (and possi-
bly future) members of the Supreme Court.382 Such a process is
therefore unlikely to result in a timely reinterpretation of Section
10(b) on the basis of consistent principles.
Codification serves the dual functions of preserving the private
right of action from the prospect of incremental judicial erosion while
providing the opportunity for a principled pruning of its most expan-
sive applications. The antifraud private right of action plays a vital
role in the enforcement of securities regulation; its complete abolition
would be unthinkable, given the impossibility of government regula-
tors alone policing such a vast market. By the same token, the private
cause of action as it has developed through the federal common law
should not be considered sacrosanct: policy makers should not hesi-
tate to use codification to narrow the scope of the Rule 10b-5 cause of
action so that it fits more clearly within the overall structure of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.383
At least one commentator has argued that the SEC should pursue
disimplication of the private cause of action through a "concept re-
lease" that would precede an administrative rulemaking. 384 Under
this approach, the SEC would reevaluate the appropriate scope of the
cause of action and replace the current language of Rule 10b-5 with
more explicit provisions. It is true that Section 10(b) is essentially a
delegation of authority to the SEC. However, disimplication and sub-
stitution via an SEC rulemaking cannot resolve the current debate
concerning the scope of private actions brought under Section 10(b).
First, even if the SEC were to substitute a new rule for the cur-
rent text of Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court would continue to be the
final arbiter of the scope of conduct prohibited by the plain meaning
of Section 10(b). The authority delegated to the SEC via Section
10(b) is the authority to prescribe specific acts and practices that have
been found to be fraudulent; the SEC does not have the authority
under Section 10(b) to redefine the elements of fraud itself.385 There-
fore, any new rule seeking to redefine the scope of the private cause
of action would be subject to challenge as exceeding the grant of au-
382. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at 1098.
383. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 965-66 (suggesting that the SEC has the authority to
limit private claims under 10b-5 to a scope smaller than currently recognized under the law,
while retaining its own enforcement authority over a broader scope of conduct); Grundfest,
supra note 14, at 729 ("Professor Seligman's effort to dismiss further inquiry into fundamental
reform as unnecessary is... premature at best...."); David Ratner, Appealing for the Repeal of
Rule lOb-5, RECORDER, May 26, 1992, at 8, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Rcrdr File. But
see Cunningham, supra note 42, at 1444 (stating that the appropriate response to the prospect of
undue civil liability under Rule 10b-5 is to police the conduct of attorneys, rather than "redefin-
ing substantive obligations under the securities laws").
384. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 1023-24.
385. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Rule 14e-
3(a) exceeds the grant of authority delegated to the SEC under § 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
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thority contained in Section 10(b). Supreme Court precedent defining
the permissible scope of private liability, and all of its internal contra-
dictions, would be left untouched by the SEC rulemaking.386 An ad-
ministrative disimplication would merely add one more potential layer
of complexity to the already difficult task of interpreting the private
cause of action.387
Second, it appears likely that in the near future Congress will
have to take up the task of codifying the prohibition on insider trad-
ing. Both the Fourth Circuit, in Bryan,388 and the Eighth Circuit, in
United States v. O'Hagan,38 9 have held that the plain meaning of Sec-
tion 10(b) does not permit the government to use the misappropria-
tion theory as a basis for imposing liability for insider trading. The
O'Hagan court went further and held that Rule 14e-3(a), prescribing
insider trading in connection with tender offers, is an impermissible
exercise of the SEC's rule-making authority.39 ° The analysis in both
Bryan and O'Hagan is heavily influenced by the Supreme Court's tex-
tualist pronouncements in the Central Bank of Denver case. The
Supreme Court has been asked to resolve this split in the circuits,39'
and it appears doubtful that the textualist approach favored by cur-
rent members of the Court will look kindly upon either the misappro-
priation theory or Rule 14e-3(a).
Congress is unlikely to accept the relatively narrow scope of in-
sider trading conduct that would be subject to prosecution in the ab-
sence of the misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3(a).392 The
logical solution to judicial decisions abrogating these grounds of liabil-
ity would be a fresh effort to codify the scope of conduct held to con-
stitute insider trading. By forcing Congress to revisit the codification
of insider trading liability, the Bryan and O'Hagan decisions also pro-
vide a valuable opportunity for Congress to address the codification of
private litigation under Section 10(b) in general.
386. Notwithstanding the deference that reviewing courts are obligated to accord agency
constructions of statutes pursuant to the agency's delegated authority, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), it appears unlikely that such
deference would extend to a substituted text of Rule lOb-5 that exceeds the boundaries of Sec-
tion 10(b) as described in the Court's prior rulings. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627-28. But see
Grundfest, supra note 7, at 984-85, 1011-14. For example, the Commission would be precluded
from promulgating a substituted Rule lOb-5 that provides for aiding and abetting liability.
387. See Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793,
797 (1967).
388. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944, 952 (4th Cir. 1995).
389. 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
390. See id. at 627.
391. The validity of the misappropriation theory was recently reaffirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit. See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 667 (1996).
392. See Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 225
(1985). It appears that a textualist method of interpretation bodes ill for the future of the misap-
propriation theory under the Supreme Court's construction of Section 10(b)'s current language.
In contrast, Congress expressed approval of the misappropriation theory when it enacted the
1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act. See Gabaldon, supra note 71, at
1093.
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Therefore, congressional codification, rather than agency action,
is a preferable vehicle for the reform of the private right of action
under Section 10(b).39 3 Prior, albeit unsuccessful, efforts have been
made to codify the provisions for securities fraud.394 Some observers
have been quick to dismiss a possible role for Congress in the reform
of Section 10(b) jurisprudence. 395  Critics have suggested that such a
task is too "politically charged," "contentious," "labor-intensive," or
"intricate" for Congress to undertake. 396 However, the codification of
a private cause of action for securities fraud goes to the heart of the
structure and purposes of the securities laws and, as such, is inappro-
priate for delegation to an administrative agency like the SEC. Basic
rights and obligations of citizens should be defined by the citizens'
elected representatives.
Congress would be aided in its task by a large body of precedent
and academic literature, by the ALI's Proposed Federal Securities
Code, by its prior efforts to codify the prohibition against insider trad-
ing, by the debate over the initial drafts of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act, and by analogous code provisions in other
countries. The possible alternative formulations of the private cause
of action are readily discernable. In addition, Congress has evidenced
a willingness of late to reassert itself in the context of securities regu-
lation, as opposed to its past practice of abdication to the judiciary.397
If Congress is capable of instituting fundamental changes in other ar-
eas of the securities laws by, for example, crafting legislation that will
preempt state securities laws in significant new ways, then Congress is
capable of codifying the scope of conduct that will give rise to liability
under the private cause of action for securities fraud.
393. See generally Steinberg, supra note 14, at 516-17. But see Lewis D. Lowenfels, The
Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA. L. REv. 615, 655-60 (1979) (arguing
that the ALI's Proposed Federal Securities Code was not "essential" and was therefore unwise).
394. See ALl Proposed Federal Securities Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 345 (1978); Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 387; Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch
Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1425 (1979); Louis Loss, Introduction: The Federal
Securities Code-Its Purpose, Plan, and Progress, 30 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1977); Lowenfels,
supra note 393, at 615.
395. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 1019 (citing past congressional efforts that were stymied
by "gridlock"); Grundfest, supra note 14, at 744 (expressing doubt that a "purely political resolu-
tion" of this debate is possible); Langevoort, supra note 268, at S-19; Ruder, supra note 26, at
1486-87.
396. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 966-67 (suggesting that any reform of the substantive
reach of the private cause of action should be undertaken through SEC rulemaking).
397. Congress recently passed legislation intended to preempt state oversight of mutual
funds and scale back state regulation of primary offerings by large corporations. See supra notes
10-12 and accompanying text. Other provisions contained in this legislation include a grant of
authority to stock brokers to execute as many as 10 trades per year on behalf of preexisting
clients in states where the brokers are not licensed, and elimination of federal supervision over
investment advisory firms and their employees when those firms manage less than $25 million.
See id.; see also Jeffrey Taylor, Critics Look to Tone down Securities Bill, WALL ST. J., July 1,
1996, at A16.
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The current political environment also may favor the congres-
sional codification of the securities fraud private right of action.
Members of the plaintiffs' bar might prefer codification within certain
boundaries that, at a minimum, ensure the survival of some meaning-
ful private enforcement. They may believe that, over time, the
Supreme Court's textualist approach to the interpretation of Section
10(b) will succeed in limiting the scope of the 10b-5 cause of action far
more than any legislative effort to define its boundaries. Similarly,
recent judicial interpretations of Section 10(b) that threaten the SEC's
enforcement authority may convince the agency of the advantages of
codification. In addition, the SEC no longer appears to support an
overly expansive private enforcement mechanism and may welcome a
congressionally defined remedy with a less ambitious scope than cur-
rently exists.
Congressional efforts at reform around the edges of private litiga-
tion, like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, cannot resolve
the current debate concerning the private cause of action. Only by
tackling head on questions concerning the content of the cause of ac-
tion can the cause of action be redefined in a manner consonant with
the rest of the securities laws. It is incumbent on Congress to revise
Section 10(b) in order to fully set forth the conduct that is to be con-
sidered fraudulent under Section 10(b), the class of potential defend-
ants who will be held liable for such conduct under federal law (as
opposed to existing state law), and the class of investors eligible to
recover damages for that conduct. Such an approach would be the
inverse of the current course chosen by Congress, which is to largely
leave the definition of fraud to the courts and to either (1) abrogate
those few rulings where Congress believes that the courts have gone
too far, or (2) place procedural restrictions on would-be plaintiffs that
hamper both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims.398
VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come to recognize that the use of the federal com-
mon law to define the contours of 10b-5 liability has been a failure.399
The purpose of this article is not to suggest that the present state of
securities fraud jurisprudence is the result of one wrong turn in the
dynamic interpretation of congressional language. Federal common
398. Cf Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1993).
Congress has done the same thing in the context of insider trading, a variant of 10b-5 liability.
But this exercise of judicial lawmaking is even more deplorable, because the courts are the pri-
mary expositors, through the common-law method, of criminal liability.
399. Long ago, one of the preeminent scholars in this field confessed to being "ashamed" at
this process of "backdoor jurisprudence." See Louis Loss, History of S.E.C. Legislative Pro-
grams and Suggestions for a Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 795, 796 (1967). Judge Easterbrook's character-
ization of jurisprudence relating to the subject of the 10b-5 statute of limitations-"one tottering
parapet of a ramshackle edifice"-has become an increasingly appropriate epithet for the pri-
vate cause of action as a whole. See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987).
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law has failed precisely because the lack of any clear direction from
Congress within the statutory text makes misinterpretation a virtual
impossibility. The vague language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
can support almost any proffered reading. As a result, the parameters
of the private cause of action for securities fraud are defined by a
Gordian knot of contradictory policy goals and shifting interpretive
methodologies. Each of the steps in this process can be defended per-
suasively, but a principled defense of the whole-in its present form-
is impossible. For this reason, codification is a necessary route to
reform.
Codification will not foreclose the judiciary's ability to interpret
the substituted text in a dynamic fashion. However, codification will
give the courts sufficient guidance to cabin the vagaries of their inter-
pretations within acceptable limits. It will allow the participants in the
securities industry to better order their conduct in compliance with
the law. Codification also presents an opportunity to bring the private
cause of action under Section 10(b) back within the borders of the rest
of the Securities Exchange Act-borders that it overflowed long ago.
For this reason, codification should proceed along the lines of the
express causes of action already present in the securities laws. Inves-
tor protection can be accomplished without codifying all of the expan-
sive interpretations that the judiciary has seen fit, from time to time,
to give to the elements of the cause of action. In particular, the cause
of action should be codified with the goal of ensuring investor protec-
tion through the combined public and private enforcement of the fed-
eral securities laws as a whole, in conjunction with state law.
Policy makers have long recognized the benefits of integrated
mandatory disclosure provisions under the securities laws and the
need to avoid excessive duplication of disclosure requirements. 4°°
The enforcement provisions of the law should be viewed in the same
manner. There is no need for a "catch-all" securities fraud provision
that displaces other preexisting, and adequate, remedies.
Congress is the appropriate institution to perform this function,
because Congress alone can rectify the inability of the current statu-
tory text to be interpreted in a coherent fashion. Gradual reform by
the Supreme Court, through the reinterpretation of the text, is subject
to the same unpredictable shifts in judicial philosophy and interpretive
method that brought us to this point. In addition, the wholesale re-
drafting of the private cause of action is a political act that the Court
should avoid.
Although the SEC is capable of drafting a substituted text for
Rule 10b-5, its handiwork will remain subject to the Supreme Court's
shifting attitude toward the construction of Section 10(b). Unless the
SEC is satisfied with a substituted cause of action that is narrower, in
400. See HAZEN, supra note 71, at 119-20.
[Vol. 1997
HeinOnline  -- 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 144 1997
No. 1] VAGARIES OF THE COMMON LAW 145
all respects, than the current judicial interpretation of Section 10(b)
provides, the product of a SEC rulemaking will be subject to years of
litigation before its validity can be determined. Legislation by Con-
gress suffers no such defects. It also appears likely that Congress will
be forced to codify the prohibition on insider trading if it wants to
preserve the current scope of insider trading liability from future ero-
sion. The opportunity presented by such an effort should not be
wasted. Congress must take up a task that it has successfully avoided
for sixty-one years and codify the private cause of action for securities
fraud.
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